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A COMMON CONFLICT: COMMON FUND 
DOCTRINE AND MEDICAL PROVIDER 
LIENS IN TORT SETTLEMENTS 
Abstract: Plaintiffs in negligent tort actions often recover less money than they 
need to resolve all of their accident-related debts due to the insufficient availabil-
ity of liability insurance proceeds. Two significant debts common to these tort ac-
tions are liens for medical treatment of injuries that plaintiffs sustain and the at-
torney’s fees plaintiffs incur in pursuing liable insurance companies. The law 
places plaintiffs’ attorneys and medical lienholders in an inherently adversarial 
position. Medical lien statutes frequently grant attorney’s fees first priority to set-
tlement proceeds but also do not require medical lienholders to reduce their 
claims, even if available insurance funds are insufficient to pay all the plaintiff’s 
debts. To resolve this impasse, plaintiffs’ attorneys often petition courts to apply 
the Common Fund Doctrine (Doctrine), an equity principle derived primarily 
from class action litigation, to force medical lienholders to reduce their claims to 
pay a proportionate share of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. This Note argues that such 
an application is an inappropriate expansion of the Doctrine and provides enor-
mous leverage to plaintiffs and their attorneys. Applying the Doctrine in this way 
exacerbates the impact of existing limitations on the recovery of medical debts 
through statutory liens and provides immense incentive for plaintiffs to hire legal 
counsel, even when it is unnecessary. This Note also argues that citing fairness or 
equity as a policy justification for the use of the Doctrine in these situations is in-
trinsically hypocritical, as such use of the Doctrine results in inequitable out-
comes for medical lienholders. Finally, this Note contends that the Bankruptcy 
Code provides a strong, federal correlative for the handling of attorney’s fees in 
settlement proceedings with insufficient funds and suggests that medical 
lienholders and personal injury attorneys should lobby to increase minimum in-
surance limits to reduce the frequency of insolvent settlements. 
INTRODUCTION 
Friends Peter, Michael, and Samir are having a quiet conversation at work 
when their coworker, Drew, approaches them.1 Drew informs the group that 
another colleague, Tom, was recently in a serious car accident.2 A drunk driver 
collided with Tom’s vehicle at a high rate of speed as Tom backed out of his 
                                                                                                                           
 1 OFFICE SPACE (20th Century Fox 1999). 
 2 Id. 
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driveway.3 Drew announces that Tom, despite still recovering from a litany of 
significant injuries, is hosting a party because he received an enormous mone-
tary sum in compensation for his damages.4 
As Peter arrives at the party, a convalescent Tom is in exceptionally high 
spirits and gleefully introduces Peter to Tom’s triumphant lawyer.5 Knowing 
that Peter is depressed about his job, Tom takes Peter aside and attempts to 
encourage him.6 Despite an uncertain prognosis and a lengthy rehabilitation 
period ahead of him, Tom shares that he considers his settlement to be both a 
blessing and a justification in the belief that good things can happen to those 
who long endure the frustration of a banal existence.7 
These scenes from the dark satire Office Space embrace two of popular 
culture’s most pervasive tropes about the law: that negligence torts always re-
sult in huge cash awards to the plaintiff and that personal injury lawyers are 
constantly seeking to turn any indication of injury into a quick profit.8 In reali-
ty, personal injury cases are frequently difficult and convoluted.9 There is often 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. Consistent with the film’s black humor, Tom had recently lost his job and had been contem-
plating suicide. Id. The drunk driver crashes into Tom immediately after Tom finds a new will to live 
and abandons his plans to kill himself. Id. 
 4 Id. Though the film does not reveal the exact amount of Tom’s settlement, Drew reports it is a 
seven-figure sum. Id. 
 5 Id. The film juxtaposes Tom’s giddiness with his extensive injuries for comedic effect. Id. Tom 
is nearly in a full body cast, has a cumbersome neck brace, and requires both supplemental oxygen 
and a wheelchair, yet he constantly grins from ear-to-ear and makes uncomfortably bad jokes about 
his serious physical condition. Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. Tom bolsters this point by revealing to Peter that Tom’s settlement money has allowed him 
to develop a prototype for a ridiculous business idea that Tom devised years previously, but never had 
the time or financial resources to pursue. Id. Thus, the implication is that the settlement money has 
solved all of Tom’s problems, notwithstanding any physical pain he now suffers. Id. 
 8 Id.; see also, e.g., MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Fox 1992) (providing a satirical representa-
tion of the opportunistic practices of personal injury lawyers). Personal injury attorney Vinny Gambi-
ni sees a man with a neck brace at a bar and unabashedly asks the man whether he was in an automo-
bile accident. MY COUSIN VINNY, supra. Vinny is clearly disappointed to learn that a fall caused the 
man’s injury. Id. Later, Vinny asks the injured man whether he fell at his own home or at someone 
else’s and is again visibly irritated when he hears that the accident occurred in the man’s own home. 
Id. The humor derives from the implication that Vinny, despite being in town to defend his cousin in a 
capital murder case, is still the archetypical personal injury lawyer: always looking for opportunities 
to make quick and easy money by litigating negligence. Id. Rather than expressing sympathy for the 
injured man, Vinny demonstrates annoyance that the man caused his own harm. Id. 
 9 See What Makes Personal Injury Cases So Complex?, WELSH & WELSH (Apr. 19, 2017), https://
welsh-law.com/2017/04/makes-personal-injury-cases-complex/ [https://perma.cc/J3LJ-C3LA] (dis-
cussing several complicating factors of personal injury claims). Personal injury cases generally in-
volve unique facts and procedural concerns, and attorneys must prepare them accordingly. Id. Seeking 
compensation from a tortfeasor’s insurance company is a painstaking effort, typically requiring, inter 
alia, a prolonged and detailed discovery process. Id. Should the tortfeasor’s insurance company deny 
liability or fail to agree with the plaintiff’s attorney on a settlement amount, litigation and resolution 
of personal injury cases can require years of work. Id. Crucially, tort liability as it pertains to automo-
bile accidents is likely to become even more complicated as self-driving cars and other autonomous 
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no guarantee that the insurance proceeds will fully compensate plaintiffs for 
their losses, much less provide them with life-changing financial security.10 
Available insurance proceeds can be limited, especially when tort actions in-
volve multiple injured plaintiffs, or might not be available at all, should the 
responsible party fail to carry applicable liability insurance coverage.11 Fur-
thermore, the injured plaintiff is rarely the sole claimant to settlement funds.12 
                                                                                                                           
vehicle technology continues to develop. See Madeline Roe, Note, Who’s Driving That Car?: An Analy-
sis of Regulatory and Potential Liability Frameworks for Driverless Cars, 60 B.C. L. REV. 317, 333–
34 (2019) (discussing the potential difficulties in establishing liability in accidents involving driver-
less cars). 
 10 See Zachary Reynolds, Note, Liens and Leeches: The Unfair Application of the Illinois Health 
Care Services Lien Act and the Need for Reform, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 105, 105–06 (2017) (providing 
an example of a serious automobile accident that resulted in comparatively paltry monetary recovery 
for the plaintiffs). The author provides one example of how the amount plaintiffs receive in settlement 
of a negligence suit and the amount plaintiffs actually pocket can be drastically different. See id. (ref-
erencing Blagota and Tomica Premovic, who brought a personal injury lawsuit against a negligent driv-
er); see also Jeff Overly, Ill. Hospital Tried to Swipe Patients’ Settlement Cash, Suit Says, LAW360 (May 
1, 2012), http://www.law360.com/articles/335839/ill-hospital-tried-to-swipe-patients-settlementcash-
suit-says [https://perma.cc/E2H6-87BH] (providing a more detailed discussion of the Premovic case). 
In the example case, the liable insurance company settled with two injured plaintiffs for $27,000. 
Reynolds, supra, at 106. The plaintiffs pocketed far less, however, given that the plaintiffs owed ap-
proximately $8,500 in medical expenses resulting from the accident. Id. The hospital that treated the 
plaintiffs asserted a hospital lien against the settlement for its total charges for services, instead of 
billing the plaintiffs’ health insurance that would have paid the hospital at reduced contractual rates. 
Id. at 105–06. As a result, the plaintiffs used a significant portion of their settlement funds to pay the 
medical provider, thus dramatically reducing their personal share of the award. Id. 
 11 See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 105–06 (providing an example of multiple plaintiffs receiving 
a modest collective award); see also Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1364 
(N.M. 1994) (providing an example of a plaintiff invoking her uninsured motorist coverage because, 
as the victim of a hit-and-run accident, she was unable to identify the tortfeasor’s liability insurance 
policy or establish if one even existed). The plaintiff in Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare System 
encountered both the problem of not being able to pursue the tortfeasor and the problem of having 
limited insurance funds. See 871 P.2d at 1364 (illustrating that the insurance plan that provided com-
pensation to the plaintiff was the plaintiff’s own inadequate uninsured motorist policy). The plaintiff 
was the victim of a hit-and-run accident and was never able to pursue the liable party. See id. (noting 
that the plaintiff invoked her uninsured motorist coverage because she was the victim of a hit-and-run 
scenario). Although the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist coverage was instrumental in providing her with 
funds necessary to resolve her accident-related damages, the coverage was insufficient to cover all of 
her debts. See id. (providing that the plaintiff’s representative received the $105,000 limit of the plain-
tiff’s uninsured motorist policy, but that the plaintiff’s accident-related debts, including the attorney’s 
fees and other legal expenses, exceeded that amount). 
 12 See, e.g., Kannaday v. Ball, 631 F. App’x 635, 636–37 (10th Cir. 2015) (providing an especial-
ly devastating set of facts, with the tortfeasor carrying $50,000 in total accident liability coverage but 
with three plaintiffs claiming aggregate hospital bills approaching $300,000); Ayla Ellison, Physical 
and Financial Injuries: The Common Fund Doctrine and Its Application Under the Illinois Health 
Care Services Lien Act, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 305, 306 (2014) (providing the details of a case with a 
single injured plaintiff with multiple lienholders as claimants to the settlement funds). Insurance funds 
can insufficiently compensate plaintiffs because the tortfeasor’s actions injured more than one indi-
vidual. See Kannaday, 631 F. App’x at 636–37 (demonstrating how multiple personal injury claims 
against the same insurance policy for the same accident can quickly exhaust the available insurance 
proceeds). Insurance funds can also fail to make an injured person whole because multiple third par-
2622 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2619 
Any financial award the plaintiff receives must also compensate for costs the 
plaintiff incurs as a result of the accident or in pursuit of the settlement.13 
Should the plaintiff be unable to pay off all accident-related debts entirely from 
the settlement funds, creditors may be able to pursue the plaintiff directly.14 
For medical providers, liability settlements are a viable means to resolve 
patient debts, despite the risks associated with the possibility of insufficient 
insurance proceeds.15 If an injured plaintiff lacks health insurance coverage, 
pursuing reimbursement from a tort settlement might be the only source of re-
covery for a medical provider, short of billing the plaintiff directly.16 Addition-
ally, state laws, regulatory agencies, and insurance plan coordination of bene-
fits rules often dictate that hospitals seek reimbursement for accident-related 
charges in a manner dependent on the coverage available.17 For example, if an 
                                                                                                                           
ties, including the plaintiff’s attorney, have asserted liens against the settlement to secure payment for 
services rendered to the plaintiff in connection with the plaintiff’s claim. See Ellison, supra, at 306 
(demonstrating how attorney’s fees, hospital bills, physician bills, and physical therapy bills all absorb 
portions of an injured plaintiff’s monetary award). 
 13 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 306 (providing an example where attorney’s fees and multiple 
medical provider bills significantly reduced a plaintiff’s personal share of a tort settlement). 
 14 See id. at 310 (citing 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 23/45 (West 2008)) (illustrating, as an exam-
ple of the statutory authority granted to healthcare providers by one state, that the Illinois Health Care 
Services Lien Act permits a healthcare provider to pursue any balance left unpaid by the liability in-
surance settlement directly from the plaintiff). 
 15 See, e.g., Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1364 (providing an example where, had the plaintiff not carried 
adequate uninsured motorists insurance coverage, there likely would have been no proceeds for the 
defendant medical provider to pursue at all). Further complicating a plaintiff’s decision to pursue a 
liability settlement are strong negative perceptions plaintiffs can have about medical providers taking 
a portion of a tort settlement that is, at least ostensibly, intended to compensate accident victims for 
more than just their medical debts. See Eric Peterson, Shakedown, SALT LAKE CITY WKLY. (Feb. 26, 
2009), https://www.cityweekly.net/utah/shakedown/Content?oid=2136559 [https://perma.cc/FP3R-
Y2RR] (illustrating one tort plaintiff’s frustration with a medical provider for pursuing reimbursement 
directly from her insurance settlement instead of billing her Medicare coverage). 
 16 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 305–06 (providing an example of a medical provider asserting a 
hospital lien against a plaintiff’s tort settlement because the plaintiff did not have health insurance at 
the time of injury); see also Alex W. Schulte, Note, Healthcare Liens and the Common Fund Doc-
trine: The Need for Legislative Action to Prevent Fee Shifting at the Expense of Healthcare Providers, 
98 IOWA L. REV. 1763, 1788 (2013) (discussing how any amount of the medical provider’s bill that 
remains unpaid after resolution of the tort settlement requires the medical provider to pursue the plain-
tiff directly to recoup). Recent loss of employment can be especially detrimental to plaintiffs in these 
situations, as job loss results both in loss of employer-provided insurance benefits and loss of the 
necessary income to pay medical bills outright. Ellison, supra note 12, at 305–06. 
 17 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(3)(a)–(b) (West 2018) (providing an example of a state 
hospital lien statute that precludes a provider from asserting a lien against a tort liability settlement if 
the injured party has health insurance, unless the health insurance plan does not cover or otherwise 
timely pay the provider’s bill); 211 MASS. CODE REGS. 38.05 (2021) (providing medical providers in 
Massachusetts with the rules for billing automobile accident-related charges when a patient has both 
health insurance coverage and medical coverage under their automobile insurance policy); CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., YOUR GUIDE TO WHO PAYS FIRST 20 (2021), https://www.
medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/02179-medicare-coordination-benefits-payer.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHF3-
YRZE] (providing Medicare’s guidance to subscribers that medical providers should seek reimburse-
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accident victim’s health insurance plan is secondary to any available liability 
coverage, a hospital must seek reimbursement from the liability insurance be-
fore it may bill the health plan.18 
Further complicating the calculus of determining an injured plaintiff’s re-
covery is the fact that difficult tort cases often result in plaintiffs hiring attor-
neys to resolve them.19 The plaintiff normally pays attorney’s fees from the 
funds the plaintiff receives in settlement.20 Thus, although hiring an attorney 
may increase a plaintiff’s settlement award, it may not increase what the plain-
tiff actually pockets in compensation for the plaintiff’s damages.21 This pre-
sents an immediate and obvious performance standard for the personal injury 
attorney.22 The attorney must justify the plaintiff’s increased costs to hire 
                                                                                                                           
ment for charges relating to treatment of accident-related injuries from any available liability insur-
ance plan prior to seeking reimbursement from Medicare). 
 18 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 17, at 20 (providing Medi-
care’s secondary payer rules). Automobile insurance plans, including uninsured and underinsured 
motorist coverage, constitute liability coverage for the purposes of coordinating multiple available 
insurance payers. See id. (providing Medicare’s classification of automobile coverage as liability 
insurance). Health plans often retain subrogation rights should a medical provider bill them prior to 
settlement of the tort claim, or where they are otherwise a secondary payer. See id. (illustrating Medi-
care’s subrogation rights). Subrogation, in the context of coordinating multiple available insurance 
plans, involves a primary payer, such as a medical benefits plan on the injured plaintiff’s automobile 
insurance policy, seeking reimbursement from the liable insurance plan for any amount that the prima-
ry payer paid in reimbursement of accident-related charges. See Subrogation, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The substitution of one party for another whose debt the party pays, enti-
tling the paying party to rights, remedies, or securities that would otherwise belong to the debtor.”). 
See generally MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., MED PAY/PIP SUBROGATION IN ALL 50 
STATES (2021), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MED-PAY-PIP-SUBRO-
CHART.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBC8-3GCR] (providing the subrogation laws for automobile policy-
based medical benefits coverage in each state). 
 19 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 306 (suggesting that plaintiffs not only hire attorneys because 
they feel they need one in order to resolve their claims against liable insurance companies, but also 
that plaintiffs may be willing to pay legal fees at higher than market rates for increased chances of 
substantial financial recovery). 
 20 See id. at 312–13 (detailing the process by which plaintiffs’ attorneys can assert liens against 
their clients’ insurance settlement to secure reimbursement of their fees). 
 21 See id. at 313 (demonstrating how attorney’s fees function similarly to medical provider liens 
in the disbursement of settlement funds); see also Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 
1363, 1364 (N.M. 1994) (illustrating that, because the insurance company tendered the limits of the 
policy, the medical debt absorbed approximately 66% of those limits, and the attorney’s contingency 
fee was 33% of the recovery, retaining an attorney did not increase the plaintiff’s award). Notably, 
Illinois seems to have adopted its statutory language specifically to prevent attorney’s fees from being 
overly burdensome in tort liability cases. 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10(c) (2020); Ellison, supra note 
12, at 313. The Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act prohibits attorney’s fees from absorbing over 
30% of the plaintiff’s liability settlement where the lien-to-settlement ratio exceeds 40%. Ellison, 
supra note 12, at 313 (citing 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 23/10(c)). 
 22 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 306 (illustrating the plaintiff’s expectation that hiring an attorney, 
and more to the point, hiring an expensive attorney, increases the likelihood of securing a significant 
award on the plaintiff’s behalf). 
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counsel by ensuring that the plaintiff’s net financial gain is greater than it oth-
erwise would have been without the attorney’s services.23 
Where available insurance proceeds do not make each injured plaintiff 
whole, personal injury attorneys must stretch the proceeds that their clients 
receive to cover all accident-related debts.24 Critically, attorneys must often 
find a way for the plaintiff to pocket some money, even though the funds 
available are insufficient even to cover the plaintiff’s losses.25 Attorneys can 
explore several options for achieving this objective.26 First, attorneys can 
simply reduce their fees to free up funds to pay other claimants.27 Second, at-
torneys can request that the medical provider that treated the plaintiff reduce 
the amount of its claim against the liable insurance company.28 Third, attorneys 
can require medical providers to reduce their claims via automatic reductions 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See id. (implying, anecdotally, that a plaintiff’s decision to hire a personal injury attorney, like 
most purchases, is subject to an economic cost/benefit analysis). 
 24 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1364 (providing an itemization of one plaintiff’s accident-related 
debts compared to the available insurance proceeds, thereby highlighting the need for the plaintiff’s 
attorney to negotiate the debts to avoid leaving the plaintiff with considerable financial problems). 
 25 See id. (providing an example of a plaintiff’s attorney and the medical providers that treated her 
reducing their claims in order to facilitate settlement where the available insurance funds were insuffi-
cient to cover all accident-related debts). 
 26 See id. (discussing the option of the plaintiff’s attorney reducing their own fees); Ellison, supra 
note 12, at 309 (discussing statutorily-imposed reductions on medical providers under the Illinois 
Health Care Services Lien Act). 
 27 See, e.g., Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1364 (providing an example of a personal injury attorney re-
ducing his fees to facilitate settlement of a case with extremely limited availability of insurance pro-
ceeds). Although this method may permit an attorney to free up funds without requiring authorization 
by anyone other than the attorney, both plaintiffs’ attorneys and academics have noted that it raises a 
fundamental question of fairness: why should an attorney reduce legal fees so that other claimants, 
who undoubtedly benefit from the attorney’s work in securing the settlement, do not have to do the 
same? See Yaeger v. City of Lincoln (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bloomquist), 523 
N.W.2d 352, 354, 360 (Neb. 1994) (noting that the plaintiffs argued for application of the Common 
Fund Doctrine (Doctrine) and that justification for the Doctrine’s use is prevention of inequity); El-
lison, supra note 12, at 322–23 (arguing that medical providers who share in the tort awards benefit 
from the work of the plaintiff’s personal injury attorney and thus should share in the payment of attor-
ney’s fees). 
 28 See, e.g., Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1364 (providing an example of a case where a hospital claimant 
to settlement funds refused to reduce the amount of its claim despite a dearth of available proceeds, 
implying that the plaintiff’s personal injury attorney had requested, either directly or indirectly, the 
hospital to do so). The obvious disadvantage to this strategy is that a medical provider has no obliga-
tion to reduce its claim unless imposed by statute or common law. See id. (providing an example of a 
case where a plaintiff’s personal injury attorney and a hospital claimant to the plaintiff’s settlement 
proceeds argued whether the controlling hospital lien statute required hospital lienholders to reduce 
their claims to pay a proportionate share of attorney’s fees). Even if a plaintiff’s attorney can convince 
a medical provider to reduce the amount of its claim against the settlement, there is legitimate ques-
tion as to how effective this strategy ultimately is, given that medical providers can often simply pur-
sue the plaintiff for any unpaid balances once the attorney disburses settlement funds. See Ellison, 
supra note 12, at 314 (indicating that medical providers are not limited to recovery simply via the 
enforcement of their claims against a plaintiff’s settlement with the liable insurance company). 
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that either state statutes or binding common law impose.29 Despite these op-
tions, the frequency at which plaintiffs pursue liability cases with insufficient 
available insurance funds, combined with the naturally-conflicting positions of 
attorneys and medical claimants, means that plaintiffs’ attorneys and medical 
providers often disagree as to the proper course of action when there simply is 
not enough money to go around.30 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys have often tried to break these deadlocks by propos-
ing to invoke the Common Fund Doctrine (Doctrine) to impose automatic re-
ductions on medical providers.31 The Doctrine provides that where a lawyer 
generates a common fund for the good of one or more third parties, the law-
yer’s fee should derive from that fund to ensure that each beneficiary effective-
ly pays a fair share of the lawyer’s fee.32 In the context of a liability settlement 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See, e.g., Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1366 (reasoning that because New Mexico’s medical lien stat-
ute does not levy a recovery cap upon medical providers, the court was free to consider whether im-
posing a mandatory reduction of medical liens to assist in paying attorney’s fees would be appropri-
ate); Ellison, supra note 12, at 309 (providing an example of how one state, Illinois, imposes a forced 
reduction on medical provider claims); see also, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2251 (2017) (provid-
ing an example of a state statute that imposes an automatic reduction of hospital liens and therefore 
liens exceeding the amount of available insurance funds cannot attach to the entire settlement). For 
example, some states proscribe medical providers from absorbing more than a specified percentage of 
the plaintiff’s settlement amount, regardless of how much the provider charges for the treatment it 
rendered to the plaintiff. See Ellison, supra note 12, at 309 (citing the respective statutes of Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, and Tennessee as examples). Other states 
permit a medical provider to assert a claim against a liability settlement only if the claim does not 
exceed a specific dollar amount, regardless of what the medical provider is actually charging the 
plaintiff. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-66.2 (2015 & Supp. 2021) (providing that hospitals in the 
state of Virginia can assert liens against liability settlements, but only for $2,500 or less). 
 30 See, e.g., Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1098 (providing a 
class of plaintiffs that derives from several initial tort suits; each individual plaintiff disagreed with the 
defendant, a billing agent for medical providers, regarding whether the state’s hospital lien statute 
requires medical providers to reduce their claims in order to pay a proportionate share of plaintiffs’ 
attorney’s fees). 
 31 See, e.g., id. at 1102–03 (providing one case with a class of plaintiffs all seeking to apply the 
Doctrine to reduce medical provider liens in their respective settlements). Where medical provider lien 
statutes do not specifically provide for automatic reductions to medical liens according to their propor-
tionate share of attorney’s fees, those in favor of applying the Doctrine to the same effect generally 
cite to the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez as persuasive authority. See, e.g., Alas-
ka Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for or to Be Paid on Behalf of E.R. ex 
rel. Ridley, 84 P.3d 418, 431 (Alaska 2004) (agreeing with the Martinez court and applying its hold-
ing to the instant case); see also Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1368 (holding that a medical provider is re-
sponsible for paying a proportionate share of a plaintiff’s attorney’s fees). Notably, most state courts 
have declined to follow the Martinez decision, holding instead that there is no binding authority or 
adequately persuasive policy reason to force medical providers to reduce their liens to pay a propor-
tionate share of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646, 
649–50 (Ill. 2011) (providing an extensive list of cases from states that have declined to apply the 
Doctrine in these situations). 
 32 Ellison, supra note 12, at 314 (quoting Scholtens v. Schneider, 671 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Ill. 
1996)). These discussions generally define third parties very broadly to include any claimant other 
than the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney that receives a benefit under the settlement. Id. 
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where the plaintiff’s debts exceed the insurance proceeds, courts apply the 
Doctrine by compelling each third-party claimant to reduce its claim by its 
proportionate share of the total attorney’s fees.33 
Some proponents of using the Doctrine cite essential questions of fairness 
to justify its use.34 Under this framework, courts can support using the Doc-
trine where the plaintiff shoulders all the risks and costs of retaining an attor-
ney but shares the proceeds of such representation with third parties, including 
lienholders, who do not pay for the representation.35 Thus, advocates argue 
fairness dictates that all who share the proceeds of a settlement must also share 
equally in the risks and costs incurred to obtain that settlement.36 
Other proponents of using the Doctrine in the tort settlement context point 
to the Doctrine’s value as an equity principle.37 Principles of equity seek to 
eliminate unjust enrichment.38 Proponents justify the use of the Doctrine be-
cause the settlement unjustly enriches medical providers unless they contribute 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See, e.g., Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1364 (providing the figures of one case to illustrate how the 
Doctrine applies in practice). In Martinez, the plaintiff’s attorney secured $101,628.93 in settlement 
proceeds. Id. The attorney’s fees totaled $35,824.20. Id. The defendant medical provider’s lien se-
cured $29,308.97. Id. In attempting to impose a mandatory reduction of the medical provider’s lien by 
applying the Doctrine, the attorney filed a declaratory action to recoup $10,606.04 from the medical 
provider as the medical provider’s fair contribution to the attorney’s fee. Id. Simple math reveals how 
the attorney might have calculated the provider’s share: $10,606.04 is approximately 29% of the total 
attorney’s fees, and the medical provider’s lien of $29,308.97 is approximately 29% of the total set-
tlement award, the common fund that the attorney’s efforts created. See id. (providing the base 
amounts of the total settlement, attorney’s fees, and medical provider lien to make this calculation). 
The rationale for the proposed reduction thus becomes clear: if a third-party claimant is asserting a 
claim to 29% of the established fund, it should pay 29% of the attorney’s fees the plaintiff incurred to 
generate that fund. See id. (providing the financial figures supporting this position). 
 34 See id. at 1366 (distinguishing the instant case’s engagement with a fundamental fairness anal-
ysis from previous cases that effectuated an equity and unjust enrichment analysis). 
 35 See id. at 1366–67 (characterizing the potentiality of a plaintiff bearing all the costs and risks of 
pursuing a settlement and all the plaintiff’s relevant creditors enjoying the proceeds from that settle-
ment while contributing nothing towards it as unduly burdensome and inherently prejudicial to the 
plaintiff). 
 36 Id. 
 37 See Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1102–03 (illustrating the plaintiff’s contention that the court should 
apply the Doctrine to impose a pro-rata distribution of attorney’s fees); Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. 
Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646, 648 (Ill. 2011) (noting that justification for the Doctrine includes preventing 
medical providers from gaining from the attorney’s work without paying for it). 
 38 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 326 (noting that a medical lienholder’s securing of its full lien 
amount, without paying a share of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, constitutes unjust enrichment because it 
contravenes equitable disbursement of settlement funds); see also Equity, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra note 18 (illustrating the roots that equity has in both fair-dealing and judicial intervention 
where meticulous or literal adherence to the law produces unjust results). Precisely defined, unjust 
enrichment is either: (1) “[t]he retention of a benefit conferred by another not as a gift, but instead in 
circumstances where compensation is reasonably expected”; or (2) “[a] benefit obtained from another, 
not intended as a gift and not legally justifiable, for which the beneficiary must make restitution or 
recompense.” Unjust Enrichment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 18. See generally infra 
note 99 and accompanying text (providing the Martinez court’s distinction between the fairness argu-
ment and the unjust enrichment argument). 
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a proportionate share of attorney’s fees.39 Specifically, advocates assert that all 
lienholders in a liability settlement, medical providers included, benefit from 
the work of the plaintiff’s attorney.40 Lienholders benefit because the attor-
ney’s work allows the plaintiff to pay lienholders from the settlement and dis-
charges the plaintiff’s debt to the lienholder, but the lienholder does not con-
tribute to the legal fees essential to obtaining those benefits.41 
Despite these contentions, a majority of courts have ruled against apply-
ing the Doctrine when there is no binding authority imposing an obligation on 
medical lienholders to contribute to attorney’s fees.42 These courts have point-
ed to a variety of factors in explaining their decisions, and often emphasize 
that: (1) medical lienholders maintain a creditor-debtor relationship with tort 
plaintiffs, which establishes a right to payment independent of the settlement 
outcome; and (2) a plaintiff hires legal counsel under contract, and any benefit 
that a medical lienholder realizes therefrom is simply ancillary to the services 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See, e.g., Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103 (providing an example of how one plaintiff argues dis-
gorgement of unjust enrichment as justification for use of the Doctrine to reduce medical provider 
liens). 
 40 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 321–22 (analyzing what constitutes a “benefit” under unjust en-
richment law in Illinois to argue that medical lienholders should pay a portion of plaintiffs’ attorney’s 
fees); Reynolds, supra note 10, at 123 (arguing that imposing reductions on medical liens to compel 
medical lienholders to share in the plaintiff’s legal fees is one way to prevent claimant freeriding). 
Freeriding, in this context, refers to a medical provider doing nothing more to secure a settlement with 
the liable insurance company than filing a lien for its accident-related charges. See Reynolds, supra 
note 10, at 123 (citing Brase ex rel. Brase v. Loempker, 642 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)) 
(arguing that requiring hospitals to reduce their liens for legal expenses averts provider freeriding by 
forcing providers to participate in the process to secure a settlement); see also Brase, 642 N.E.2d at 
205 (providing an example of freeriding by a subrogee who sought full recovery of its claim despite 
largely disengaging from settlement proceedings). 
 41 Ellison, supra note 12, at 322. This is a significant issue for those who argue against applica-
tion of the Doctrine, as there is question as to whether a medical provider, the creditor in a business 
transaction with the plaintiff-debtor, truly benefits from the attorney’s establishment of the common 
fund. See Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103 (illustrating the Utah Supreme Court’s holding that a medical 
provider does not actually benefit from the work of the plaintiff’s attorney because the medical pro-
vider’s right to payment is contractual). By this rationale, the work of a plaintiff’s attorney adds no 
value to a medical provider-claimant, as the medical provider has a right to payment that exists inde-
pendently of the tort action. Id.; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the position that the plaintiff’s 
attorney’s work is essential for a lienholder to effectuate a recovery, and arguing that such a position 
misrepresents a medical lienholder’s involvement in the settlement and its rights and obligations as a 
creditor of medical debt). 
 42 See Wendling, 950 N.E.2d at 649–50 (providing an extensive list of decisions on the issue, 
from a significant breadth of state courts). The Wendling court notes that most courts that have con-
sidered applying the Doctrine to reduce medical liens in tort liability settlements with limited insur-
ance proceeds have declined to do so. Id. Specifically, the Wendling court lists decisions from four-
teen states that held that medical lienholders do not have to pay a share of attorney’s fees. Id. The 
court also provides a list of courts from three other states that held the opposite view, ruling in favor 
of the plaintiff and requiring the medical lienholders to pay a share of the attorney’s fees. Id. at 650. 
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that the plaintiff hired the attorney to provide.43 Notwithstanding these hold-
ings, recent academic discussions suggest that it is unfair for medical lienhold-
ers not to contribute to plaintiffs’ legal costs, and implore both the courts and 
lawmakers to reconsider the issue.44 
Part I of this Note discusses the principal components of tort liability set-
tlements and how they contribute to this issue.45 Part II of this Note analyzes 
and interprets the breadth of legal arguments both for and against applying the 
Doctrine within the context of liability settlements with limited available in-
surance proceeds.46 Part III of this Note identifies underlying assumptions up-
on which such arguments rely.47 Part III also discusses the problems associated 
with utilizing the Doctrine to grant automatic reductions of medical lien bal-
ances.48 Part IV of this Note proposes relying on the Bankruptcy Code as a 
strong model for how to treat attorney’s fees in the context of indigent settle-
ments and suggests that medical providers and personal injury attorneys work 
together to raise state-based minimum insurance limits to reduce the frequency 
at which injured parties must settle for less than their claims are worth.49 
I. GOVERNING FACTORS IN THE DISBURSEMENT OF SETTLEMENT 
PROCEEDS: PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEYS VS. MEDICAL PROVIDERS 
The need for plaintiffs’ attorneys to negotiate with medical providers 
largely depends on state laws regarding required insurance coverage, medical 
lien rights, and applicability of the Doctrine within the tort settlement con-
text.50 Section A of this Part discusses the variety of state-imposed automobile 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See, e.g., id. at 649 (stating that most courts that have considered applying the Doctrine have 
decided against it); Bashara v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985) (holding 
that a hospital does not have an obligation to pay for a plaintiff’s legal fees just because the plaintiff’s 
attorney generated a settlement from which the hospital received reimbursement for its charges); 
Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103 (holding that the contract for services and consent to treatment form the 
basis of the medical provider’s right to payment; thus, a medical provider claimant to a liability set-
tlement is not a true beneficiary of the common fund the attorney establishes by securing the insurance 
proceeds). 
 44 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 320–26 (discussing the issue as explored in Martinez and expand-
ing the Martinez court’s analysis to argue that more courts should apply the Doctrine as the Martinez 
court did); see also Reynolds, supra note 10, at 137 (arguing that both state legislatures and the courts 
should reevaluate the breadth of decisions that heretofore have advantaged medical lienholders over 
injured plaintiffs, including those pertaining to use of the Doctrine). 
 45 See infra notes 50–107 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 108–159 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 160–208 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 160–208 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra notes 209–239 and accompanying text. 
 50 See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 121–25 (discussing the conflict between attorney liens and 
medical provider liens and the use of the Doctrine to address the conflict); MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & 
LEHRER, supra note 18, at 1–2 (discussing the impact that state-specific automobile insurance laws 
have on an injured plaintiff’s capacity to sue a tortfeasor for damages). 
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insurance coverages and how they contribute to or help prevent the problem of 
plaintiff debts far exceeding available insurance proceeds.51 Section B of this 
Part discusses the origin of medical liens and their relationship to attorney 
liens.52 Section C of this Part provides a brief history of the Doctrine and how 
courts have traditionally applied it .53 
A. State Control of Available Insurance Coverage 
Automobile accidents are widespread and familiar torts.54 Consequently, 
state requirements for automobile insurance coverage are often determinative 
factors in how frequently tort plaintiffs face settlement offers that do not cover 
all the plaintiff’s tort-related debts.55 States are stringent, relaxed, or compro-
mising in establishing thresholds for the minimum amount of insurance cover-
age all persons must carry to be legal automobile operators.56 
A plethora of automobile insurance options and policy upgrades exist.57 
Some are only available in specific markets, and states differ on which types of 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See infra notes 54–75 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 76–93 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 94–107 and accompanying text. 
 54 See Car Accident Statistics in the U.S., DRIVER KNOWLEDGE, https://www.driverknowledge.
com/car-accident-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/5BD3-ZMU3] (providing national car accident statistics 
for the United States). The average number of annual car accidents in the United States is over six 
million. Id.; see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 
53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 293, 294–95 (2018) (providing that the number of automobile accidents in 
the United States eclipses six million annually, that such accidents result in injuries to approximately 
4.6 million people, and that about half of the injured accident victims pursue tortfeasors for damages). 
 55 See, e.g., Kannaday v. Ball, 631 F. App’x 635, 636–37 (10th Cir. 2015) (providing a fact pat-
tern that demonstrates how easily liability insurance proceeds can exhaust without making an injured 
plaintiff whole). The facts of Kannaday v. Ball provide an especially tragic example of how standard 
liability insurance can provide insufficient coverage against catastrophic loss. Id. The tortfeasor in 
Kannaday, Stephanie Hoyt, conducted an illegal U-turn in front of an oncoming semi-truck. Id. at 
636. Hoyt perished in the subsequent collision, and the three passengers in Hoyt’s car were each se-
verely hurt. Id. at 636–37. Hoyt carried both personal injury protection coverage and liability coverage 
on her vehicle, in compliance with Kansas law. Id. Hoyt’s liability policy limits were $50,000 for a 
single accident, severely inadequate to cover the nearly $300,000 of medical debt that her three in-
jured passengers accrued in aggregate. Id. Regrettably, Hoyt’s passengers also lacked underinsured 
coverage to help mitigate their losses. See id. at 642 (noting that Hoyt’s insurance had erroneously 
determined that only one of Hoyt’s passengers did not have underinsured coverage). 
 56 See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, supra note 18, at 2 (discussing both the types of automo-
bile insurance coverage each state requires and the system of calculation each state uses to establish its 
threshold for minimum coverage); Kayda Norman, Minimum Car Insurance Requirements by State, 
NERDWALLET, https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/insurance/minimum-car-insurance-requirements 
[https://perma.cc/2M7W-9DAQ] (providing a chart of the minimum automobile liability and unin-
sured and underinsured motorist coverage required in each state). 
 57 See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, supra note 18, at 1–2 (providing a concise history of 
no-fault laws and a discussion of their current application amongst the states that continue to enact 
them); Norman, supra note 56 (discussing both automobile liability coverage and uninsured and un-
derinsured motorists coverage, and the types of protections they provide). 
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coverage they require.58 Three automobile insurance policy options have a 
substantive impact on the availability of insurance proceeds and on the oppor-
tunity for an injured person to sue in tort: (1) no-fault coverage, including per-
sonal injury protection and medical payments coverage; (2) bodily injury lia-
bility coverage; and (3) uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.59 Gen-
erally, the more of these policy options a state requires the greater the likeli-
hood injured parties will recover adequate monetary awards in compensation 
for their accident-related losses.60 
1. No-Fault Insurance Coverage 
The first of these automobile insurance policy options is no-fault cover-
age.61 No-fault provides coverage for loss, including reimbursement of medical 
claims, for all subscribers on the policy regardless of who was at-fault for 
causing an accident.62 Crucially, where states require no-fault coverage, poli-
cyholders must meet a threshold before they can sue a liable party in tort.63 
This can permit an injured party’s insurance policy to cover at least some 
claims, thus increasing the amount of insurance money available and improv-
ing the odds that the injured party will receive sufficient reimbursement for all 
accident-related debts.64 State insurance laws dictate whether a state requires 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, supra note 18, at 3–22 (providing a comprehensive 
chart of the no-fault laws of each state); Norman, supra note 56 (providing a chart of the minimum 
automobile liability and uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage required in each state). 
 59 See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, supra note 18, at 3–22 (elucidating in comprehensive 
detail the different first-party automobile insurance laws in each state); Norman, supra note 56 
(providing a comprehensive illustration of the different automobile insurance policy requirements of 
every state). 
 60 See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, supra note 18, at 1–2 (discussing, for example, the 
advantages each type of no-fault coverage provides to insured subscribers). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 2; see also infra note 64 and accompanying text (providing further discussion of the dif-
ferent approaches states employ in regulating both the availability of no-fault coverage and the ability 
of accident victims to sue tortfeasors for damages). 
 64 See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, supra note 18, at 2 (discussing the different types of 
no-fault coverage available, and the thresholds they impose for pursuing a tortfeasor). Regarding no-
fault coverage, each state follows one of four models: (1) modified no-fault; (2) add-on no-fault; (3) 
choice no-fault; and (4) tort. Id. Modified no-fault states require all drivers at minimum to meet a 
statutory obligation of no-fault coverage before they can sue an at-fault tortfeasor for accident-related 
damages. Id. The minimum no-fault threshold in these states can be monetary, verbal, or a blended 
model of the two. Id. Monetary threshold no-fault states impose a precise dollar figure of no-fault 
coverage. Id. For example, Utah requires all drivers to carry at least $3,000 in no-fault coverage that 
they must normally exhaust before they may pursue a tort action. Id. at 20. Verbal threshold no-fault 
states are similar, except that these states base the minimum threshold on injury classifications rather 
than on dollar balances. Id. at 2. For example, Florida establishes that drivers can sue in tort if an 
injured party dies or suffers extreme or debilitating injury. Id. at 7. Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, and Utah are modified no-fault states. Id. at 
2. Add-on no-fault states do not require drivers to carry no-fault coverage, but they do offer no-fault 
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either policyholders to obtain no-fault coverage or insurers to offer it as a non-
mandatory policy option.65 
2. Liability Insurance Coverage 
The second critical insurance policy option is liability coverage.66 Liabil-
ity coverage does not protect against the policyholder’s own losses that occur 
as a result of an accident.67 Rather, liability insurance covers the damages other 
people incur because of the policyholder’s negligence.68 Although most states 
require every legal driver to carry a minimum amount of liability coverage, the 
threshold for meeting the minimum liability coverage requirement differs sig-
nificantly from state to state.69 Where state minimum liability insurance re-
quirements are lower, the odds are greater that an injured plaintiff will assert a 
                                                                                                                           
coverage as a policy option. Id. Should drivers in add-on no-fault states choose to purchase no-fault 
coverage, they do not have to exhaust it before pursuing a tort claim. Id. Arkansas, Delaware, Mary-
land, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and Washington are add-on no-fault 
states. Id. Choice no-fault states require no-fault coverage and provide drivers with the option of opt-
ing out of the tort system entirely. Id. Should a driver opt into the tort system, then automobile insur-
ance coverage works in choice no-fault states exactly as it does in modified no-fault states. Id. All 
drivers must carry a minimum amount of no-fault coverage that they must exhaust before the driver 
can pursue a tort claim. Id. Should drivers opt out of the tort system, they only retain no-fault cover-
age, and have no ability to sue in tort should the driver’s no-fault coverage fail to cover all the driver’s 
accident-related debts. Id. By opting out of the tort system, however, other parties cannot sue the driv-
er in tort either. Id. Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania are choice no-fault states. Id. Tort states 
do not require no-fault coverage at all. Id. Injured parties have no bar to suing an at-fault party in tort, 
and the tortfeasor’s liability coverage will be the primary automobile insurance-based source of com-
pensation available for a plaintiff’s accident-related damages. Id. 
 65 Id.; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the different no-fault coverage 
options available in each state). For a concise history of automobile no-fault coverage in the United 
States, see Engstrom, supra note 54, at 309–15. 
 66 See Norman, supra note 56 (establishing automobile liability insurance requirements for each 
state). 
 67 See Sarah Schlichter, What Is Liability Car Insurance and How Much Do You Need?, NERD-
WALLET, https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/insurance/auto/liability-car-insurance [https://perma.cc/
PD5X-CTT2] (noting the accident-related damages that automobile liability covers). 
 68 Id. Notably, there are two types of liability coverage within an automobile insurance policy: 
bodily injury liability and property damage liability. Id. Bodily injury liability covers damages to the 
plaintiff’s person and covers medical debts, lost wages, and legal expenses. Id. Property damage lia-
bility covers damage to the plaintiff’s property. Id. Bodily injury liability policies have two separate 
limits: a smaller number that sets the maximum per individual claimant, and a larger number that sets 
the aggregate maximum for all claimants involved in the same accident. Id. 
 69 See Norman, supra note 56 (providing the exact amount of coverage drivers in each state must 
carry to meet state minimum coverage requirements). Alaska, for example, has comparatively high 
minimum bodily injury liability coverage, requiring $50,000 in individual and $100,000 in total acci-
dent bodily injury liability coverage. Id. But see Schlichter, supra note 67 (noting that Alaska is one of 
very few states that permits some drivers not to carry liability coverage). By contrast, California im-
poses very low minimum bodily injury liability coverage, requiring $15,000 in individual and $30,000 
in total accident bodily injury liability coverage. Norman, supra note 56. Unlike no-fault coverage, 
minimum required liability coverage always maintains a monetary threshold. See id. (discussing the 
common format for expressing liability insurance limits). 
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claim for accident-related debts exceeding the value of a liable party’s insur-
ance policy; conversely, the more liability coverage a state requires, the better 
the odds that tort plaintiffs will recover adequate settlements.70 This also 
means that states with higher minimum liability insurance thresholds present 
fewer scenarios where either an attorney or a medical claimant must reduce its 
claims for settlements to finalize.71 
3. Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists Insurance Coverage 
The third impactful insurance policy option is uninsured and underinsured 
motorist coverage.72 This coverage protects policyholders when an uninsured 
or underinsured tortfeasor causes injury to them.73 If an injured plaintiff carries 
this type of coverage, the plaintiff can file a claim on the plaintiff’s own policy 
if the tortfeasor has insufficient insurance proceeds to cover all the plaintiff’s 
accident-related debts, including attorney’s fees.74 Like no-fault coverage, state 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See, e.g., Kannaday v. Ball, 631 F. App’x 635, 636–37 (10th Cir. 2015) (providing a personal 
injury case that demonstrates how damages can quickly outpace available coverage). The at-fault 
driver in Kannaday was insured under a Kansas automobile insurance policy and carried the minimum 
bodily injury liability limits permitted by Kansas law: $25,000 per claimant and $50,000 per accident. 
Id. Each injured plaintiff’s hospital bill far exceeded the tortfeasor’s per-claimant policy limit: within 
days of receiving a demand letter to split the available proceeds evenly amongst the three claimants, 
the tortfeasor’s insurance company learned that one claimant’s medical claim was in excess of 
$44,000, another claimant’s medical claim was in excess of $95,000, and the final claimant’s medical 
claim was in excess of $158,000. Id. at 637. In the aggregate, the injured plaintiffs had medical claims 
of nearly $300,000 and only $50,000 available to pursue from the tortfeasor’s insurance policy. Id. 
Notably, this $300,000 figure constituted only these plaintiffs’ combined hospital bills; it did not in-
clude any other costs these plaintiffs incurred as a result of the accident, including attorney’s fees. See 
id. (characterizing the debts specifically as pertaining to medical treatment). 
 71 See Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1364 (N.M. 1994) (providing a case 
where the reduction of both attorney’s fees and medical liens was necessary to effectuate a workable 
settlement due to the paucity of available insurance funds compared to accident-related debts). For 
example, in Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare System, the lack of adequate insurance proceeds de-
rived from the fact that an uninsured motorist policy was the only source of recovery for the plaintiff, 
rather than from insufficient liability insurance limits. Id. The effect, however, is the same. See id. 
(demonstrating that more insurance coverage would have reduced the need for lien reductions and 
increased the chances of the plaintiff recovering an award commensurate with the damages). 
 72 See Schlichter, supra note 67 (providing a listing of states that require uninsured and underin-
sured motorist coverage as part of the standard automobile insurance policy). 
 73 See Norman, supra note 56 (explaining both underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage and 
what types of damages they cover). 
 74 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1364 (providing an example of uninsured motorist coverage consti-
tuting the entirety of a plaintiff’s settlement award). Plaintiffs may also invoke uninsured coverage 
when the tortfeasor cannot be identified, such as in hit-and-run accidents. See id. (providing an exam-
ple of a plaintiff filing an uninsured motorist claim because the plaintiff could never successfully 
locate the tortfeasor of a hit-and-run accident). Uninsured and underinsured motorists coverage can be 
exceptionally important in the disbursement of settlement funds, especially where liability coverage is 
limited. See Kannaday, 631 F. App’x at 637 (noting that the insurance adjuster’s settlement disburse-
ment decisions relied substantially on which plaintiffs had underinsured coverage and which did not). 
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insurance laws determine whether a state requires uninsured or underinsured 
motorist coverage or offers it as a non-mandatory policy option.75 
B. Medical Liens and Priority Issues with Attorney’s Fees 
Where state laws permit, medical providers may file liens when they treat 
patients injured in automobile accidents or via other torts.76 Liens derive from 
three different sources: statute, common law, and equity.77 Medical provider 
liens are statutory liens.78 Such liens exist under a specific, legislatively-
enacted statute and provide a lien interest to parties who file their liens accord-
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Norman, supra note 56 (providing a state-by-state report of the minimum automobile in-
surance requirements). Presently, twenty states and Washington D.C. require drivers to carry unin-
sured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, or both. Id. These states include: Connecti-
cut, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. Typically, the amount of uninsured or underinsured mo-
torist coverage a state requires tracks the state’s minimum per-claimant and per-accident bodily injury 
liability coverage. Id. 
 76 See, e.g., 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10 (2020) (providing the law of Illinois as an example of 
the rights and obligations states often impose on medical lienholders in tort settlements); Reynolds, 
supra note 10, at 110–13 (providing a summary of the procedures and limitations the Illinois Health 
Care Services Lien Act imposes on medical lienholders). There are many types of liens, but generally 
speaking, a lien expresses “[a] legal right or interest that a creditor has in another’s property, lasting 
usu[ally] until a debt or duty that it secures is satisfied.” Lien, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
18. More specifically, a hospital lien is “[a] statutory lien asserted by a hospital to recover the costs of 
emergency and ongoing medical and other services. The lien applies against any judgment, compro-
mise, or settlement received by a hospital patient either from a third person who caused the patient’s 
injuries or from the third person’s insurer.” Id. Language common to state medical provider lien stat-
utes track the common characteristics of hospital liens that these definitions identify; specifically, 
liens that attach to the patient plaintiff’s settlement become ineffective once the patient-plaintiff re-
solves the debt obligation the lien secures. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1 (West 2018) (provid-
ing the Utah hospital lien statute’s attachment provisions); id. § 38-7-5 (requiring a medical lienholder 
to release its lien once the patient pays the amount for which the provider files it). 
 77 See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 108 (citing 51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 7 (2016)). Medical provider 
liens, as statutory liens, are distinguishable from both common law liens and equity liens. See id. (citing 
R.J. Robertson, Attorney Liens in Illinois: An Analysis and Critique, 30 S. ILL. L.J. 1, 3 (2005)). Com-
mon law liens attach to property to which the lienholder has added value and grants to the lienholder a 
right of possession. See id. (citing Robertson, supra, at 3) (providing a bailment scenario as an exam-
ple of a common law lien). Equitable liens arise when the lienholder, by agreement or contract, pro-
vides labor, goods, or services, increasing the value of personal property or real estate. Id. at 108 n.23. 
The lien disgorges any unjust enrichment afforded to the property owner by realizing the increase in 
the property’s value without paying for the services that provided him with that benefit. Id. 
 78 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1365 (classifying medical liens in New Mexico as statutory); Ba-
shara v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1985) (discussing the medical lien 
statute in Texas and the legislative intent in enacting it); Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 
52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1098 (discussing a medical lien dispute as depending entirely on the correct inter-
pretation of a specific provision of Utah’s hospital lien statute); Reynolds, supra note 10, at 108 (not-
ing that medical provider liens in Illinois are examples of statutory liens); see also UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 38-7-1 (providing an example of a state medical lien statute). 
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ing to the statute’s requirements.79 Medical provider liens are unique in that 
they do not grant an interest in real or personal property.80 Rather, they grant 
an interest in any proceeds provided to an injured party by a liable party in set-
tlement of tort-related damages.81 The interest granted is a right to payment in 
the amount for which the lienholder files the lien, which is the debt obligation 
the patient plaintiff incurred in exchange for treatment.82 
Medical lien statutes are the product of state legislatures.83 There is sig-
nificant variation as to which rights a medical provider can assert against the 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 108 n.24. (citing Robertson, supra note 77, at 4 & n.20). 
 80 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-27-101(4) (West 2021) (establishing that medical pro-
vider liens in Colorado create only a right to payment from the plaintiff’s personal injury settlement); 
770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10(a) (2020) (illustrating that medical provider lien rights in Illinois are 
inextricable from the plaintiff’s tort settlement); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-8-1(A) (2020) (demonstrating 
that medical providers in New Mexico may assert liens only against any tort settlement the plaintiff 
pursues); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(1)(a) (establishing that medical liens in Utah attach only to a 
plaintiff’s tort settlement). 
 81 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(1)(a) (“[A] hospital located within the state that furnishes 
emergency, medical, or other service to a patient injured by reason of an accident is entitled to assert a 
lien upon that portion of the judgment, settlement, or compromise going or belonging to the patient 
. . . .”). Notification requirements often reiterate that medical provider liens attach to pending insur-
ance settlement proceeds by requiring lienholders to name either the tortfeasor or the liable insurance 
company (or both) on the lien and to serve copies of the lien to them before settlement occurs. E.g., id. 
§ 38-7-2(1)–(2). Utah’s medical lien statute, for example, provides that: 
A hospital lien upon damages recovered or to be recovered for personal injuries or 
death shall be effective if: (1) a verified written notice is filed in the district court of the 
county in which the hospital asserting the lien is located containing: . . . the name of the 
person, firm, or corporation alleged to be liable to the injured party for the injuries and 
damages sustained . . . (2) the hospital sends by certified mail with return receipt re-
quested, prior to the payment of any money to the injured person or his attorney or heirs 
or legal representatives as compensation for the injuries and/or damages sustained, a 
copy of the written notice, together with a statement of the date of filing, to the person, 
firm, or corporation alleged to be liable to the injured party for the injuries and/or dam-
ages sustained . . . . 
Id. 
 82 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-27-101(1)–(4) (establishing both that medical liens 
secure compensation for treatment the plaintiff receives and that the amount of filed medical provider 
liens must be for “reasonable and necessary” charges). Medical lien release requirements frequently 
reinforce medical liens as establishing nothing more than a right of payment by stipulating that 
lienholders must release medical liens upon receipt of payment from the liability settlement. See, e.g., 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-5 (West 2018 & Supp. 2021) (“The hospital shall, upon receipt of payment 
of the lien or the portion recoverable under the lien: (1) execute and file, at the expense of the hospital, 
a release of lien . . . .”). This distinguishes hospital liens from both common law liens and equitable 
liens. See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 108 (discussing the rights both common law liens and equitable 
liens confer on lienholders). 
 83 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 10, at 110–13 (discussing the evolution of medical liens in 
Illinois, culminating with passage of the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act in 2003 and amend-
ment in 2012). 
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tort settlement of an injured party.84 Generally, where medical lien statutes re-
strict the rights of providers to assert liens is in: (1) the timing of the lien fil-
ing; and (2) the amount the lienholder can seek to recover.85 Lenient states 
provide few, if any, limitations on medical provider lien rights.86 Other states 
impose relatively moderate limitations, such as timely filing provisions permit-
ting providers to file liens up until the date the settlement funds disburse.87 
Still other states regulate the practice of medical lien-filing so heavily that it is 
either difficult for providers to assert liens properly or difficult for providers to 
justify asserting liens at all because they secure little financial recovery.88 Fi-
nally, some states have no lien statutes at all.89 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 306 (noting that state legislatures create the statutes that grant 
medical lien rights). 
 85 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-27-101(1)–(4) (limiting the recovery of medical pro-
vider liens to “reasonable and necessary charges” for the lienholder provider’s services); see also 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-2(2) (West 2018) (providing that medical providers in Utah must file and 
mail their liens prior to disbursement of the settlement funds for the liens to be valid). The Virginia 
medical lien statute caps the amount a hospital lien may secure at $2,500. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-66.2 
(2015 & Supp. 2021). The Texas medical lien statute permits lien filing only if the plaintiff patient 
sought treatment from a hospital within seventy-two hours of the accident. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 
§ 55.002 (West 2021). The Texas statute further allows medical providers to include only charges 
stemming from the first 100 days of treatment in the amount the lien secures. Id. § 55.004(b)(1). 
Statutory lien provisions often impose notification requirements upon lienholders as well. See, e.g., 
Ellison, supra note 12, at 312 (discussing the notification requirements under the Illinois Health Care 
Services Lien Act). 
 86 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1 (providing an example of a state medical lien statute with 
few consequential restrictions impacting would-be medical lienholders). In terms of timing re-
strictions, Utah’s statute requires only that lienholders file their liens with the proper district court and 
notify the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s liability insurance carrier prior to the disbursement of any 
funds from the settlement. Id. § 38-7-2(2). Notably, this allows medical providers to file and assert 
liens even after the plaintiff and the liable party have agreed to a settlement amount, as long as no 
money has actually changed hands. See id. (establishing that medical providers in Utah have a right to 
assert a lien until the date settlement funds disburse, not the date the parties reach a settlement agree-
ment). In terms of amount restrictions, Utah’s statute requires only that medical providers do not file 
their liens in excess of reasonable charges for their services, and that medical providers do not assert 
liens against extremely paltry settlements of less than $100. Id. § 38-7-1(1)(c). 
 87 See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., HOSPITAL LIEN LAWS IN ALL 50 STATES passim 
(2020), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/HOSPITAL-LIEN-LAWS-IN-ALL-
50-STATES-CHART-00215685x9EBBF.pdf [https://perma.cc/89HQ-JYVZ] (providing a compre-
hensive chart of the hospital lien laws in all states, distinguishing states with extensive restrictions 
from states with moderate or mild restrictions). Utah is an example of a state with mild timely filing 
restrictions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-2(2) (providing that medical lienholders must provide no-
tice of a filed lien to the plaintiff before the plaintiff receives any money from the tortfeasor’s insur-
ance company). Illinois is an example of a state with relatively modest recovery restrictions. See El-
lison, supra note 12, at 309 (describing that the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act limits the sum a 
medical lien can claim from an injured plaintiff’s settlement to no more than one-third of the tort set-
tlement, regardless of the amount of the medical provider’s charges). 
 88 See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., supra note 87 passim (distinguishing between 
states with extensive restrictions from states with moderate or mild restrictions). Virginia imposes 
some of the most severe restrictions of all states; medical liens in Virginia can secure only a maximum 
of $2,500, notwithstanding whatever outstanding balance the plaintiff owes in relation to the medical 
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Medical lien statutes are typically silent on the use of the Doctrine.90 
Most state statutes address priority issues between attorney liens and medical 
provider liens by specifically stating which liens the settlement proceeds are to 
pay first.91 Thirty-two states establish that attorney liens have priority over 
medical liens.92 The remaining state lien statutes either establish priority for 
medical provider liens over attorney liens or limit the percentage of the settle-
ment that medical provider liens may absorb.93 
                                                                                                                           
provider’s treatment of the plaintiff’s accident-related injuries. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-66.2. Statutes 
can also impose arduous filing deadlines; Alabama, for example, requires medical providers wishing 
to assert a lien to do so within twenty days of the patient plaintiff’s discharge from the medical pro-
vider’s facility. ALA. CODE § 35-11-371(b)(2) (2021). 
 89 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 312 (citing Thomas v. Okla. Orthopedic & Arthritis Found. Inc., 
903 P.2d 279, 284 (Okla. 1995)) (maintaining that medical providers cannot assert liens in states that 
do not have a medical lien statute). Medical providers in these states have no legal basis for asserting 
liens against tort settlements and must instead seek reimbursement for treatment of accident-related inju-
ries via other means. Id. 
 90 See Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1366 (N.M. 1994) (noting the 
court’s recognition of the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ interpretive framework on this issue of the 
Doctrine, given that the state’s medical lien statute is silent); Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 
UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1102–03 (noting the court’s recognition that endorsement for application of 
the Doctrine is not in the text of the state lien statute, so support must instead come from a specific 
interpretation of the statute); Ellison, supra note 12, at 315 (noting that the Illinois Health Care Ser-
vices Lien Act is silent on the applicability of the Doctrine). 
 91 See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., supra note 87, at 2 (providing a list of states with 
medical provider lien statutes that grant priority to attorney liens, and another list of states with stat-
utes that grant priority to medical provider liens); see also, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1 (provid-
ing an example of one state hospital lien statute that maintains a priority scheme where attorney’s fees 
are superior in position to medical liens by establishing that medical liens attach to the portion of the 
plaintiff’s settlement that remains after the plaintiff pays attorney’s fees). 
 92 MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., supra note 87, at 2. These states are: Alabama, Alas-
ka, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. Id. Utah, for example, establishes priority for payment of 
attorney’s fees by stating that medical provider liens attach only to the portion of the injured plaintiff’s 
settlement that remains after the plaintiff’s attorney takes her fee. UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1. Ver-
mont imposes a more stringent rule, providing attorney liens with priority status and prohibiting med-
ical liens from absorbing the entire settlement amount that remains after the attorney takes their fee, 
thereby reserving at least some money for the plaintiff. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2251 (2017) 
(establishing that medical liens must not attach either to $500 or to one-third of the settlement amount, 
whichever is less, and that medical liens occupy junior status to the plaintiff’s attorney’s lien); see 
also MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., supra note 87, at 28 (distinguishing Vermont’s statute 
as unique, even amongst other state statutes that grant priority statute to attorney’s liens). 
 93 MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., supra note 87, at 2. States that grant priority to medi-
cal provider liens over attorney liens include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, New 
Hampshire, and New Jersey. Id. Virginia’s statute has perhaps the most severe limitation on recovery 
for medical lienholders, limiting hospital lien recoveries to $2,500, regardless of what the plaintiff 
owes the provider. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-66.2. 
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C. Common Fund Doctrine and Its Roots in Equity 
The American Rule holds that, unless exceptional circumstances apply, 
litigants pay their own legal expenses.94 The Doctrine presents one such excep-
tional circumstance, providing an opportunity for plaintiffs to avoid taking on 
their own attorney’s fees where equity considerations demand it by imposing a 
proportional sharing requirement on all other claimants to the plaintiff’s set-
tlement award.95 Litigants have used the Doctrine for well over a century, and 
currently the Doctrine most commonly applies to class action suits.96 
A class action proceeding provides a traditional, rational context for use 
of the Doctrine because a class action pursues a judgment or settlement on be-
half of more than one plaintiff.97 Proponents of using the Doctrine outside the 
class action context assert that strict adherence to the American Rule in other 
circumstances might result in some claimants enjoying the benefits of a judg-
ment or settlement, while others bear all of the risk and all of the legal fees 
required to obtain it.98 Use of the Doctrine finds a foothold in these situations 
on fairness or unjust enrichment grounds because a third-party claimant’s re-
ceipt of settlement funds without assuming the risks of a lawsuit or contrib-
uting to litigation costs can substantially disadvantage the plaintiff.99 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 316 (citing Morris B. Chapman & Assocs., Ltd. v. Kitzman, 739 
N.E.2d 1263, 1271 (Ill. 2000)) (discussing the American Rule). The American Rule also stipulates 
that litigants cannot ordinarily receive attorney’s fees as damages from the opposing party. Id. Excep-
tions apply where a fee-shifting statute governs or where contract provisions shift attorney’s fees. Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See id. at 314–15 (providing a brief history of the Doctrine and its use within the context of 
litigation). 
 97 See id. (identifying the Doctrine’s purpose of avoiding the scenario where many parties benefit 
from a judgment or settlement, but few pay the legal costs necessary to obtain it). 
 98 See id. at 315 (providing insurance subrogation cases and wrongful death lawsuits as two ex-
amples outside the class action context where litigants have used the Doctrine). 
 99 See id. at 321 (providing the elements of unjust enrichment, as defined by the Illinois Supreme 
Court, to argue that such a scenario meets the practical definition of the term). The elements of unjust 
enrichment identified by the Illinois Supreme Court are: “(1) [a non-paying party] receives a benefit 
(2) to [a paying party’s] detriment, and (3) the [non-paying party’s] retention of that benefit violates 
the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.” See id. (referencing the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc., 545 N.E.2d 672, 
679 (Ill. 1989)). The Martinez court aptly distinguishes fairness from unjust enrichment in this con-
text. See Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1366–67 (N.M. 1994) (noting that the 
court did not view the instant case as engaging an unjust enrichment issue, but rather one of fairness). 
The unjust enrichment argument focuses on the gain the medical lienholder realizes from the work of 
the plaintiff’s attorney and asserts that it is unjust for the lienholder to enjoy that gain without com-
pensating for it. See id. (discussing how the defendant in Martinez cited to cases that held that the 
lienholder’s gain was attendant to an attorney’s duties to their client, and identifying such as unjust 
enrichment arguments). Contrastingly, the fairness argument focuses on the risk the plaintiff takes on 
in deciding to sue the tortfeasor, and maintains that it is improper for the plaintiff to assume all of the 
risk, but share the award. See id. at 1366–68 (discussing the role of risk in the assessment of fairness 
and holding that fairness dictates that lienholders should contribute a share of the plaintiff’s legal 
fees). To summarize the difference another way, the fairness argument pivots on the process by which 
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In considering whether to apply the Doctrine in tort settlements, courts 
have endeavored to determine whether the position of medical lienholders in 
such proceedings is comparable to that of class action plaintiffs.100 If it is, then 
the rationale for applying the Doctrine in class actions should also justify the 
Doctrine’s use in tort settlements.101 If it is not, then plaintiffs petitioning 
courts to force medical lienholders to contribute a proportionate share of attor-
ney’s fees must find another basis for their argument.102 
Notably, many courts have determined that medical lienholders in tort set-
tlements are in a different position than class action plaintiffs.103 These courts 
reason that a medical lienholder does not receive a benefit from the plaintiff’s 
attorney securing a tort settlement because the medical lienholder’s right to 
payment arises from the service contract executed between the plaintiff and the 
medical provider at the time of the plaintiff’s treatment.104 Consequently, the 
medical provider and plaintiff are in a creditor-debtor relationship, under 
which the medical provider retains a right to payment whether or not the plain-
tiff receives a tort settlement.105 Thus, courts often decline to apply the Doc-
trine in tort settlements.106 Courts hold that because the plaintiff’s attorney 
                                                                                                                           
the provider seeks to recover the debt; the unjust enrichment argument focuses on the interplay be-
tween the attorney, the plaintiff, and the provider, and whether the contractual obligation the plaintiff 
has to the provider precludes the attorney from conferring any kind of gain on the provider stemming 
from the attorney’s own contractual obligation to the plaintiff. See Schulte, supra note 16, at 1783 
(summarizing the Martinez court’s approach to the issue). 
 100 See, e.g., Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1103 (holding that 
a hospital and a plaintiff are engaged in a creditor-debtor relationship due to the contract formed be-
tween the two parties at the time the plaintiff received treatment). 
 101 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1366–67 (holding that the work of the plaintiff’s attorney in secur-
ing a settlement effectuates the medical provider’s lien, permitting the provider to seek reimbursement 
from a fund rather than from the patient directly; this characterizes the provider’s position more close-
ly to a class claimant than to a traditional creditor). 
 102 See Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1098 (discussing the argument that the correct interpretation of the 
language of Utah’s hospital lien statute imposes a proportionate sharing requirement for the plaintiff’s 
legal expenses); Ellison, supra note 12, at 321 (arguing that even if the relationships are not compara-
ble, unjust enrichment could still exist). 
 103 See, e.g., Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646, 651 (Ill. 2011) (distinguishing a 
medical lienholder in a tort settlement from a class plaintiff on the basis that the lienholder lacks 
standing to sue); Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103 (holding that the Doctrine does not apply to a medical 
lienholder because, as a creditor, the medical provider has a right to payment independent of the plain-
tiff’s pursuit of a tortfeasor and the medical provider has recourse for collecting its debt other than 
filing a lien); Lynch v. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 776 P.2d 681, 684 (Wash. 1989) (illustrating the court’s 
characterization of the plaintiff as a debtor and the medical lienholder as a creditor and providing the 
court’s refusal to extend the Doctrine to such an association). 
 104 Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
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provides medical lienholders no real benefit, it cannot be the case that medical 
lienholders owe a proportionate share of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.107 
II. PROS AND CONS: CASE LAW, ACADEMIA, AND THE  
ARGUMENTS FRAMING THE DEBATE 
Most courts have disallowed use of the Doctrine to impose mandatory re-
ductions of medical liens in tort settlements, though some courts have applied 
the Doctrine in such a way.108 Section A of this Part discusses the arguments in 
favor of applying the Doctrine to compel medical providers to contribute a 
proportionate share to attorney’s fees and why many courts have rejected 
them.109 Section B provides the contrary position by illustrating the rationale 
of courts that held the Doctrine should apply in such scenarios.110 Section C 
discusses recent academic considerations of the Doctrine and the arguments 
made in favor of expanding its usage to tort settlement contexts.111 
A. The Majority Position: It Is Inappropriate to Apply the Doctrine to 
Compel Medical Lienholders to Reduce Their Liens 
Many state courts have heard the issue of whether to apply the Doctrine 
to impose automatic reductions of medical liens to assist plaintiffs in paying 
for attorney’s fees.112 A substantial majority have declined to impose the Doc-
trine for such purposes.113 In rendering a holding, each court has considered 
some combination of three principal factors plaintiffs use to argue that the 
court should apply the Doctrine: (1) construction of the relevant lien statute; 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See id. (holding that because the hospital’s right to payment derives from a service contract 
executed at the time of treatment, the hospital is not reliant on the attorney’s securing of a settlement 
in order to collect on the patient’s debt). 
 108 See, e.g., Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1366 (N.M. 1994) (discuss-
ing many cases in several states rejecting the idea that medical lienholders should contribute to plain-
tiffs’ attorney’s fees and breaking with those states in holding that medical lienholders in New Mexico 
must do so). 
 109 See infra notes 112–135 and accompanying text. 
 110 See infra notes 136–150 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 151–159 and accompanying text. 
 112 See Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646, 649–50 (Ill. 2011) (providing an exten-
sive, though not exhaustive, list of cases, from seventeen different states, exploring the issue of apply-
ing the Doctrine to hospital liens within a tort settlement context). 
 113 See id. (illustrating the Supreme Court of Illinois’s agreement with many other states that 
medical lienholders are distinguishable as claimants in a tort action, as courts do not compel them to 
contribute to the plaintiff’s legal costs, even if the medical lienholder benefits from the efforts of the 
plaintiff’s retained counsel); see also Yaeger v. City of Lincoln (In re Guardianship & Conserva-
torship of Bloomquist), 523 N.W.2d 352, 358–59 (Neb. 1994) (noting that courts generally do not 
permit use of the Doctrine to reduce medical liens, and hold that standard because medical providers 
have a creditor-debtor relationship with the plaintiffs of pending tort settlements). 
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(2) unjust enrichment stemming from implied-in-fact contracts and quantum 
meruit; and (3) subrogation rights in tort settlements.114 
1. Statutory Construction of State Medical Provider Lien Laws 
In statutory lien states, courts have often evaluated statutory construction 
to determine whether lawmakers intended for courts either to impose automat-
ic reductions of medical liens to guarantee proportionate sharing of plaintiffs’ 
attorney’s fees, or to apply the Doctrine to do so.115 Although medical lien 
statutes are generally silent on the Doctrine, courts consider two conventional 
lien statute attachment provisions to divine legislative intent regarding reduc-
tions of medical liens.116 First, courts reference the governing statutory at-
tachment language to determine whether the law already limits the portion of 
an injured plaintiff’s settlement that a medical lien may recover.117 Where a 
lien statute prohibits medical liens from securing payment equal to the medical 
provider’s total billed charges, courts have permitted no additional forced re-
                                                                                                                           
 114 See Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 357–58 (providing a brief explanation of the lack of homogeneity 
amongst multiple state lien statutes); Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1366 
(N.M. 1994) (providing a list of cases in various states that dealt with issues of unjust enrichment, 
implied contracts, and subrogation rights). Precisely defined, quantum meruit is either: (1) “The rea-
sonable value of services; damages awarded in an amount considered reasonable to compensate a 
person who has rendered services in a quasi-contractual relationship”; (2) “A claim or right of action 
for the reasonable value of services rendered”; (3) “At common law, a count in an assumpsit action to 
recover payment for services rendered to another person”; (4) “A claim for the market value of a par-
ty’s performance under an implied-in-fact contract or an express contract that does not specify a 
price”; or, (5) “A claim for the value of benefits provided without a contract, as when the plaintiff 
brings a claim for restitution and that value provides the measure of recovery.” Quantum Meruit, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 18. For a discussion of subrogation within the context of 
liability insurance settlements, see supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 115 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1365 (illustrating the court’s methodology in first evaluating wheth-
er the New Mexico Hospital Lien Act provides any guidance regarding how a tort settlement must 
resolve legal costs, including attorney’s fees). For example, in Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys-
tem, the court noted that the state Hospital Lien Act does not specifically indicate whether medical 
providers must reduce their liens to pay a proportionate share of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. Id. As a 
result, the court felt free to evaluate the idea as a matter of policy. See id. (quoting Torrance Cty. Men-
tal Health Program, Inc. v. N.M. Health & Env’t Dep’t, 830 P.2d 145, 150 (N.M. 1992)) (indicating 
that the lack of a statutory requirement authorized the court to use its own judgment). 
 116 See, e.g., Harlow v. Lloyd, 809 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (identifying the provi-
sion of a medical lien statute that identifies the portion of an injured plaintiff’s settlement against 
which medical liens actually attach as an indication of legislative intent regarding lien reductions); 
Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1365–66 (identifying a medical lien statute’s establishment of a cap on the 
amount a medical lien can recover from a settlement, regardless of what the injured plaintiff actually 
owes the medical provider, as indicative of the legislature’s opinion on when, and to what extent, a 
medical provider must reduce its lien). 
 117 See, e.g., Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1365–66 (noting that because Illinois and Kansas, for example, 
established hard caps in their respective lien statutes, their legislatures likely did not want other fac-
tors, such as the Doctrine, to impose additional reductions of medical liens). 
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ductions to medical liens.118 Second, courts look to the attachment language of 
medical lien statutes to determine to which portion of the plaintiff’s pending 
tort settlement a medical lien attaches; specifically, courts must determine if a 
lien attaches to the entire settlement or only to the portion that remains after 
the plaintiff’s attorney deducts legal fees.119 Where such language exists, 
courts have held that lawmakers intended the relevant provisions to establish a 
priority system for competing lien claimants, rather than mandatory reductions 
of medical liens.120 
                                                                                                                           
 118 See, e.g., Maynard v. Parker, 387 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Ill. 1979) (illustrating that the court found 
the inclusion of a recovery cap in the Illinois Hospital Liens Act determinative in holding that the 
Doctrine does not apply to medical liens); see also Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646, 
649 (Ill. 2011) (noting the role of the cap in the Maynard court’s earlier decision to reject use of the 
Doctrine). Even courts that have authorized the use of the Doctrine to impose reductions on medical 
liens have hinted that they would not have done so if the medical lien statutes of their states included a 
limit upon the amount of a tort settlement that medical liens may recover. See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 
1366 (noting that the court felt a review of whether use of the Doctrine in a medical lien context was 
necessary because New Mexico, unlike other states whose courts have considered the same question, 
does not have a medical lien statute that imposes a limit on medical lien recoveries). 
 119 See, e.g., Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1102 (providing the 
court’s interpretation that the Utah hospital lien statute’s attachment language establishes that hospital 
liens attach to the portion of the plaintiff’s settlement that remains after the plaintiff’s attorney takes 
their fee; thus, the language engages issues of priority rather than issues of lien reductions). These 
medical lien statute provisions often seek to impose priority rules vis-à-vis attorney liens and medical 
provider liens but do so in a way that opens up the possibility of statutorily-endorsed reductions of 
medical liens. See id. at 1098 (demonstrating the need for the court to determine whether the Utah 
hospital lien statute’s attachment language establishes priority for attorney liens or whether it requires 
medical lienholders to reduce their liens in order to contribute a share of plaintiffs’ legal fees); see 
also Harlow, 809 P.2d at 1231 (illustrating the need for the court to examine the same alleged ambi-
guity within the Kansas statute). Utah’s medical lien statute provides a clear example of how the statu-
tory language can obfuscate legislative intent within the statute’s attachment rules. See Bryner, 428 
P.3d at 1098 (demonstrating how two interpretations of the Utah statute’s attachment provision can 
produce either a priority rule or an automatic pro-rata reduction of medical liens to contribute to attor-
ney’s fees). The Utah statute provides that medical providers may declare a lien against the injured 
plaintiff’s tort settlement, minus whatever amount the plaintiff pays in legal fees. See id. at 1099–1100 
(“[A] hospital . . . is entitled to assert a lien upon that portion of the judgment . . . going or belonging 
to the patient . . . less the amount paid by the patient . . . for attorney fees . . . incidental to obtaining 
the judgment . . . .”) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1 (West 2018)). Plaintiffs have contended that 
this language requires medical lienholders to reduce their liens in order to contribute a fair portion of 
the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees. Id. at 1098. The Supreme Court of Utah has disagreed, holding that the 
plain language of the provision establishes only that medical providers may assert liens against what-
ever portion of the injured plaintiff’s tort settlement remains after the plaintiff’s attorney takes legal 
fees. See id. at 1102 (providing the court’s interpretation, augmented by additional statutory language, 
that establishes that medical liens are not subject to any other forced reduction). 
 120 See, e.g., Harlow, 809 P.2d at 1231 (holding that the law rarely compensates the unsecured 
portion of a lienholder’s claim by granting it portions of a fully-secured lienholder’s recovery). The 
court in Harlow v. Lloyd utilized a pie analogy to illustrate a conventional legal analysis on lienholder 
priority disputes. Id. In deference to the analogy, the court noted that claimants who receive a whole 
slice of pie do not typically also receive portions of those who do not. See id. (noting the difference 
between being the first claimant to receive a payout and receiving full reimbursement by taking por-
tions of the shares of other claimants). The court explained that the Kansas medical lien statute, in 
permitting medical providers to assert liens against an injured plaintiff’s tort settlement so long as the 
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2. Unjust Enrichment and Quantum Meruit 
Plaintiffs emphasize the need for courts to apply the Doctrine to impose 
automatic reductions of medical liens to prevent medical lienholders from en-
joying unjust enrichment.121 Broadly defined, unjust enrichment occurs when-
ever one party retains something of value, at the expense of another party, 
without providing compensation for it.122 In applying the Doctrine to impose 
reductions of medical liens in tort settlements, unjust enrichment is the damage 
principle underlying a claim of quantum meruit.123 Claims of quantum meruit 
require, on the facts, that the defendant receive something of value from the 
plaintiff, for which the defendant had reason to believe the plaintiff expected 
remuneration or other reimbursement.124 
Plaintiffs seeking to impose medical lien reductions on claims of quantum 
meruit frequently argue that the efforts of the plaintiffs’ attorneys in settling 
tort cases benefit medical providers.125 Yet if medical providers collect the full 
amounts of their liens, they fail to offer reimbursement for the attorney’s ser-
vices.126 Courts that have considered this argument have rejected it.127 These 
                                                                                                                           
medical liens do not obstruct the fee arrangement the plaintiff constructs with their attorney, merely 
establishes that attorney liens enjoy priority to medical liens in tort settlements. See id. (noting that the 
system of priority was what the legislature envisioned when it wrote the statute). Further, the court 
held that a medical lienholder simply receiving its statutorily authorized share without reducing for 
attorney’s fees does not constitute a hindrance to the plaintiff’s fee arrangement with their lawyer. See 
id. (noting that the establishment of the attorney’s fees as having priority over medical liens provides 
sufficient safeguarding of the plaintiff-attorney contract). 
 121 See, e.g., Bashara v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985) (illustrating 
the theory that medical lienholders receiving full payment on their liens without contributing to plain-
tiffs’ attorney’s fees results in inequitable recovery). 
 122 See Hayden v. Medcenter One, Inc., 2013 ND 46, 828 N.W.2d 775, 781 (citing Zuger v. N.D. 
Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 494 N.W.2d 135, 138 (N.D. 1992)) (providing the primary components of unjust 
enrichment claims). Where a plaintiff asserts unjust enrichment realized by a defendant, a court looks 
for several elements. Id. The facts must present the defendant’s receipt of a benefit, at the expense of 
another, without rationalization of either the benefit or the expense and with equity as the only availa-
ble remedy. See id. (providing the elements of an unjust enrichment claim). For a comprehensive 
definition of unjust enrichment, see supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 123 See Hayden, 828 N.W.2d at 781 (explaining that unjust enrichment requires a claim of one 
party against another for reimbursement but without a contract, either express or implied). 
 124 See Bashara, 685 S.W.2d at 310 (quoting City of Ingleside v. Stewart, 554 S.W.2d 939, 943 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977)) (providing the essential elements of a quantum meruit claim); see also supra 
note 114 and accompanying text (providing a comprehensive definition of quantum meruit). 
 125 See, e.g., Bashara, 685 S.W.2d at 310 (providing an example of a plaintiff’s quantum meruit 
claim against a medical lienholder for services the plaintiff’s attorney provided in securing the plain-
tiff’s tort settlement). 
 126 See id. (illustrating a plaintiff’s claim that the defendant medical provider received unjust 
enrichment by not contributing to the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees). These fact patterns often compare the 
facts with the hypothetical scenario of the medical provider having to pay attorney’s fees had the 
medical provider, instead of the plaintiff, hired the attorney to settle the tort claim. See, e.g., id. (not-
ing that such a hypothetical is at least facially understandable). 
 127 See, e.g., id. (illustrating that a hospital recovering the amount of its lien does not meet the 
elements of a claim in quantum meruit). 
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courts reasoned that the plaintiff bears the responsibility for paying for the attor-
ney’s services because it was the plaintiff, not medical lienholders, who retained 
the attorney under contract.128 Any benefit that medical lienholders receive is 
merely attendant to the attorney’s satisfaction of contractual obligations.129 
3. Subrogation Rights in Tort Settlements 
Finally, courts have considered whether the rights of medical lienholders 
in tort settlements should mirror those of subrogees or those of creditors.130 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See id. (quoting Sisters of Charity of Providence of Mont. v. Nichols, 483 P.2d 279, 283 
(Mont. 1971)). There are four principal components to a claim of quantum meruit. See id. (quoting 
City of Ingleside, 554 S.W.2d at 943) (setting out the components of a quantum meruit claim). First, 
there must be something of value, whether goods or services. Id. Second, the plaintiff in the quantum 
meruit claim must have produced the items or services of value for the benefit of the person the claim 
pursues for payment. Id. Third, the person the claim pursues for payment must have taken delivery of 
and utilized the item or service of value. Id. Fourth, the person the claim pursues for payment must 
have had reasonable notice that the plaintiff anticipated compensation in return for providing the items 
or services of value. Id. Most courts have held that quantum meruit claims fail in the case of medical 
provider liens because the medical provider is not the person the claim pursues for payment. See, e.g., 
id. (noting that although the attorney’s efforts support a medical provider’s recovery of the amount 
secured via its lien, it is the injured tort plaintiff, the medical provider’s patient, and not the medical 
provider itself, that is the person owing charges for the attorney’s rendered services). Instead, these 
courts have held that it is the injured plaintiffs who contract to retain the attorneys, and it is not proper 
for the plaintiffs to impart their responsibility to pay the attorneys onto another claimant to the tort 
settlement. See id. (quoting Landman v. State, 97 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)) (noting that 
the law does not provide recourse for litigants to pass their contractual obligations to pay their attor-
ney’s fees onto another party that benefits from the attorney’s work); see also Broadlawns Polk Cnty. 
Hosp. ex rel. Fenton v. Estate of Major, 271 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Iowa 1978) (quoting Lamar v. Hall & 
Wimberley, 129 F. 79, 84 (5th Cir. 1904)) (first citing Grimball v. Cruse, 70 Ala. 534, 544 (1881); 
and then citing Roselius v. Delechaise, 5 La. Ann. 481, 482 (1850)) (noting the customary principle 
that an implied-in-fact compensation agreement does not exist between a settlement claimant and an 
attorney the claimant did not hire just because the claimant received value from the attorney’s work). 
Had the medical provider retained the attorney, not the tort plaintiff, a claim of quantum meruit would 
be appropriate. See Bashara, 685 S.W.2d at 310 (noting that a hospital would surely owe the tort 
plaintiff’s attorney a fee had the hospital hired the attorney to recover on the hospital’s lien). 
 129 See Bashara, 685 S.W.2d at 310 (holding that the advantages a medical provider enjoys in a 
tort settlement as a result of the services of the tort plaintiff’s attorney are insufficient to maintain 
responsibility of the medical provider to pay a portion of the attorney’s fees). Courts rendering this 
holding note that the fact that resolution of the tort plaintiff’s debts, for which the tort plaintiff hired 
the attorney, does not impose an implied-in-fact contract between the attorney and medical lienhold-
ers. See id. (quoting Sisters of Charity, 483 P.2d at 283) (citing Broadlawns, 271 N.W.2d at 716) 
(noting that the contract between the attorney and the tort plaintiff required the attorney to collect on 
medical liens, but that obligation does not indebt medical lienholders to the attorney). 
 130 See Maynard v. Parker, 387 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Ill. 1979) (characterizing the relationship be-
tween the tort plaintiff and the medical provider as being that of a debtor and a creditor); Harlow v. 
Lloyd, 809 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (noting the distinction between subrogor-subrogee 
arrangements and the relationship that exists between a medical provider and a patient it treated); 
Bashara, 685 S.W.2d at 310 (implying that, because the tort plaintiff and medical lienholders do not 
stand on even footing within a tort settlement, the medical providers occupy the role of a creditor, not 
that of a subrogee); Lynch v. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 776 P.2d 681, 684 (Wash. 1989) (noting that many 
courts have considered the forced reduction of medical liens to pay for plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees as an 
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Common law tradition holds that a subrogee, because it stands in the shoes of a 
subrogor in the settlement, assumes a proportionate share of the legal costs 
incurred to secure a financial award.131 Courts do not impose the same liability 
on creditors in a tort action, because a creditor’s right to payment from the tort 
plaintiff debtor exists independently of whether the tort plaintiff receives a fi-
nancial award.132 Courts have considered how to characterize a medical 
                                                                                                                           
output of equitable remedies). For a detailed discussion of subrogation in the tort settlement context, 
see supra note 18 and accompanying text. In a subrogation, a replacement claimant (the subrogee) 
assumes the position of an original claimant (the subrogor) against a settlement, often by paying a 
debt on the original claimant’s behalf, either in part or in full. Subrogee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 18; Subrogor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 18. 
 131 See, e.g., Ex parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 118 So. 3d 699, 708 (Ala. 2012) (noting 
that many jurisdictions have held that a subrogee should pay a proportionate share of the attorney’s 
fees necessary to secure a tort plaintiff’s settlement, unless the plaintiff and the subrogee had agreed 
otherwise). The decision to impose liability for a share of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees upon subrogees is 
due, at least in part, to subrogation’s roots in equity. See id. at 704 (noting that subrogation is the pro-
cess by which an insurance plan that issued payment on behalf of its injured subscriber seeks reim-
bursement from a tortfeasor). There is an obvious ideological parallel between the subrogation process 
and the application of the Doctrine. See id. (invoking the language “ought to bear” in describing a 
subrogee’s pursuit of a tortfeasor—language that is also commonly found in arguments for applying 
the Doctrine for proportionate sharing purposes); Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 
1363, 1366–67 (N.M. 1994) (holding that medical providers that recoup their debts from a tort settle-
ment have an equity-based obligation to pay a share of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees). Given that subroga-
tion is so innately tied to equitable principles, and given that a subrogee’s right to payment frequently 
actualizes because of the injured plaintiff’s attorney’s efforts to create a settlement, courts impose 
obligatory contributions to the attorney’s fees upon subrogees where a case meets the elements of the 
Doctrine. See Ex parte State Farm, 118 So. 3d at 704–05 (first citing Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Capulli, 
859 So. 2d 1115, 1127 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), and then citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. 
Freeman, 447 So. 2d 757, 760 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (discussing similar historical holdings from Ala-
bama courts). The elements are: (1) formation of a common fund; and (2) a subrogee’s receipt of gain 
due to the efforts of the plaintiff’s attorney. See id. at 708 (identifying the analysis the court used to 
determine whether to apply the Doctrine). If the facts satisfy these elements, a court may require a 
subrogee to share in paying the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees except where the subrogee itself contributed 
to creation of the common fund. See id. at 709 (citing Blue Cross, 447 So. 2d at 759–60) (noting the 
lack of justification for applying the Doctrine if the subrogee itself participated in generating the set-
tlement, as opposed to relying on the plaintiff’s attorney to do so). 
 132 See, e.g., Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646, 651–52 (Ill. 2011) (holding that 
hospital lienholders do not have to pay a proportionate share of attorney’s fees because of their status 
in the tort settlement as a creditor). Illinois case law provides a comprehensive examination of the 
different responsibilities of creditors and subrogees to contribute to attorney’s fees because the Su-
preme Court of Illinois reversed the Appellate Court on the issue. See id. (providing the Supreme 
Court of Illinois’s holding that the Appellate Court was mistaken when it expanded the Doctrine to 
cover hospital lienholders). The Appellate Court noted that creditors and subrogees are characteristi-
cally different because their rights to payment derive from different sources. See Howell v. Dunaway, 
924 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (citing Maynard v. Parker, 387 N.E.2d 298 (Ill. 1979)) 
(distinguishing the payment responsibilities of debtors and subrogors), rev’d sub nom. Wendling v. S. 
Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646 (Ill. 2011). Subrogees in tort settlements have a right to payment 
only if a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor generates a common monetary 
fund. Id. Contrastingly, creditors in tort settlements have a right to payment whether or not the plain-
tiff and the tortfeasor ever reach settlement. Id. Thus, traditional consideration of the applicability of 
the Doctrine holds that subrogees pay a proportionate share of attorney’s fees because their rights to 
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lienholder in a tort action, either as a subrogee or a creditor.133 Several of those 
courts have ruled that medical lienholders are best classified as creditors.134 
Under that finding, a majority of courts have held that medical lienholders are 
                                                                                                                           
reimbursement flow from the creation of a settlement, whereas creditors do not pay for attorney’s fees 
because their rights to payment do not. See id. (providing the conventional view that a subrogee’s gain 
from the settlement is “direct” and a creditor’s is “incidental”). The Appellate Court broadened the 
applicability of the Doctrine by holding that there exists a distinction between a traditional creditor 
and a lienholder. See id. (establishing that within a tort action, a creditor and a lienholder are two 
separate classes of party). To the Appellate Court, there are two fundamental characteristics of a 
lienholder that distinguishes it from a normal creditor. Id. First, a lienholder’s primary purpose in 
settlement proceedings is to foreclose on a lien, not resolve a debt; second, a hospital lien, by statute, 
has no binding effect absent a settlement. See id. (noting that these two characteristics cause the 
lienholder to enjoy a benefit from the settlement that is more akin to the direct gain of a subrogee than 
to the incidental gain of a creditor). The Supreme Court of Illinois disagreed, holding that regardless 
of the settlement’s role in providing liens with legal weight, the lienholder does not have a private 
right of action against the party responsible for causing the plaintiff’s injuries. Wendling, 950 N.E.2d 
at 651. Further, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Appellate Court’s characterization of 
lienholder rights being more like those of subrogees than creditors did not change the fact that plain-
tiffs’ attorneys work to create settlements for plaintiffs, not for the group of parties that may have a 
claim to settlement proceeds. Id. at 652. 
 133 See, e.g., Wendling, 950 N.E.2d at 651–52 (providing the Illinois Supreme Court’s methodol-
ogy in distinguishing medical lienholders as creditors as opposed to subrogees); Bashara, 685 S.W.2d 
at 310 (holding that a medical lienholder is a creditor because the lien stems from a contract for ser-
vices with the injured plaintiff, and because the lienholder does not have even footing with the plain-
tiff in the tort action); Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1103 (illustrat-
ing the Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning in holding that medical lienholders are creditors); Lynch, 776 
P.2d at 684 (following Maynard in holding that a medical lienholder is a creditor). 
 134 See, e.g., Maynard, 387 N.E.2d at 300 (providing an early designation, which many subse-
quent courts have followed, of medical lienholders as creditors in tort proceedings); Bryner, 428 P.3d 
at 1103 (illustrating the classification of medical lienholders as creditors as the Utah Supreme Court 
examined use of the Doctrine in tort settlement contexts in 2018). There are three commonly cited 
rationales for classifying medical lienholders as creditors within the context of a liability settlement. 
See Maynard, 387 N.E.2d at 300 (providing the contract rationale); Bashara, 685 S.W.2d at 310 
(providing the equity of position rationale); Wendling, 950 N.E.2d at 651 (providing the attendant gain 
rationale). First, there is the rationale that medical lienholders are creditors because their right to pay-
ment derives from a contract for services injured patients complete prior to discharge from medical 
treatment. See Maynard, 387 N.E.2d at 300 (noting that injured plaintiffs owe a debt to treating medi-
cal providers whether or not the plaintiff secures a damage award from the tortfeasor). Second, there is 
the rationale that medical lienholders are creditors because they cannot directly sue the tortfeasor to 
enforce their right to payment; instead, they can only foreclose their liens against their debtor—the 
plaintiff. See Bashara, 685 S.W.2d at 310 (noting that the plaintiff alone has a private right of action 
against the tortfeasor, and medical lienholders merely have a right of payment against the plaintiff). 
Third, there is the rationale that medical lienholders must be creditors because they do not straight-
forwardly gain from the work of the plaintiff’s attorney, given that the settlement is merely one option 
for the medical provider to collect the debt the injured plaintiff owes. See Wendling, 950 N.E.2d at 
651 (noting that the plaintiff’s debt to the medical provider exists regardless of whether the plaintiff 
receives a tort settlement, and that the medical provider may continue to collect from the injured 
plaintiff for outstanding balances that remain even after satisfaction of the lien). 
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not obligated to reduce their liens to pay a proportionate share of the legal fees 
and costs the plaintiff debtor incurred to render the tort settlement.135 
B. The Minority Position: Courts Should Apply the Doctrine to Compel 
Medical Lienholders to Reduce Their Liens 
Despite a strong majority of jurisdictions holding that it is inappropriate 
to apply the Doctrine to compel medical providers to contribute a proportion-
ate share of plaintiffs’ attorney’ fees in tort settlements, a minority of courts 
have disagreed and held otherwise.136 These courts have generally cited equity 
and policy concerns in favor of applying the Doctrine.137 Principally, the mi-
nority view grants considerable weight to two specific points in determining 
the arbiter of the issue on the appropriate use of the Doctrine: the significance 
of the plaintiff’s attorney’s work to the lienholder, and the significance of a 
medical provider’s decision to collect on its debt by filing a lien.138 
First, the minority view has disagreed with the majority that medical 
lienholders enjoy only an attendant advantage from the work of the injured 
plaintiff’s attorney.139 By statute, a medical lien requires the existence of a tort 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See, e.g., Wendling, 950 N.E.2d at 648, 652 (following the court’s own decision in Maynard in 
refusing to apply the Doctrine to medical lienholders because they are creditors of the injured plain-
tiff); Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103 (holding that a medical lienholder is not liable for any portion of the 
injured plaintiff’s attorney’s fees because, as a creditor, the hospital’s right to payment exists inde-
pendently of the tort settlement and the hospital can foreclose on that right independently of the in-
jured plaintiff’s actions against the tortfeasor). 
 136 See Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for or to Be Paid on 
Behalf of E.R. ex rel. Ridley, 84 P.3d 418, 434–35 (Alaska 2004) (providing the Alaska Supreme 
Court’s justification of the minority view); Yaeger v. City of Lincoln (In re Guardianship & Conser-
vatorship of Bloomquist), 523 N.W.2d 352, 360 (Neb. 2004) (providing the Nebraska Supreme 
Court’s justification of the minority view); Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367 (providing the New Mexico 
Supreme Court’s justification of the minority view). 
 137 See, e.g., Alaska Native, 84 P.3d at 434–35 (quoting Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367) (following 
the Martinez court’s equity and policy rationales); Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367 (illustrating the New 
Mexico Supreme Court’s concern that allowing a medical lienholder to enjoy the fruits of the plain-
tiff’s attorney’s labor without contributing to the costs to retain the attorney is both inequitable and 
contrary to the public policy of the State). 
 138 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1366 (supporting the need for medical lienholders to contribute to 
attorney’s fees by asserting that medical liens are dependent on the work of plaintiff’s attorneys to 
properly attach and effectuate); see also Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360 (supporting the need for medical 
lienholders to contribute to attorney’s fees by asserting that the work of the plaintiff’s attorney is what 
makes the debt actually collectible via the lien process). 
 139 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367 (illustrating the New Mexico Supreme Court’s disagreement 
that the advantages medical lienholders receive on account of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ work is merely 
negligible or ancillary). But see Bashara, 685 S.W.2d at 310–11 (quoting Maynard v. Parker, 369 
N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), aff’d, 387 N.E.2d 298 (Ill. 1979)) (providing the majority view 
that the injured plaintiff hires an attorney to resolve a claim against the tortfeasor, and that any benefit 
claimants to the tort settlement receive are simply supplementary results of the attorney’s principal 
objective). 
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settlement in order to attach.140 Therefore, the efforts of the plaintiff’s attorney 
to generate a settlement are essential to the effectiveness of the lien.141 Conse-
quently, the minority view holds that it is erroneous to classify the attorney’s 
work as merely incidental to the medical provider.142 As such, the medical pro-
vider should contribute a proportionate share to the payment of the attorney’s 
fees.143 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-27-101(4) (West 2021) (establishing that medical 
provider liens in Colorado attach to the plaintiff’s personal injury settlement); 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
23/10(a) (2020) (demonstrating same in Illinois); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-8-1(A) (2020) (demonstrat-
ing same in New Mexico); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(1)(a) (West 2018) (establishing same in Utah). 
 141 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367 (noting that without the tort settlement, the medical lien fails 
the statutory attachment requirements, rendering it useless as a debt collection device). Viewing the 
relevant hospital lien attachment requirements in context, the New Mexico statute explicitly establish-
es that hospital liens in the state attach to settlement proceeds, not to the personal property of the in-
jured plaintiff debtor. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-8-1(A)–(B) (“Every hospital located within the state 
. . . is entitled to assert a lien upon that part of the judgment, settlement or compromise going, or be-
longing to such patient . . . . A hospital lien may be filed upon damages recovered, or to be recovered, 
either as a result of a judgment, or upon a contract of settlement or compromise . . . .”). The point is 
not unique to New Mexico, as the language of the New Mexico statute has close parallels within the 
medical lien statutes of other states. Compare id. (providing the attachment provision for hospital 
liens in New Mexico), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1 (“[A] hospital located within the state . . . is 
entitled to assert a lien upon that portion of the judgment, settlement, or compromise going or belong-
ing to the patient . . . .”). 
 142 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367 (holding that because medical liens attach to a settlement, and 
because a plaintiff’s attorney obtains the settlement, the attorney’s work cannot be merely auxiliary to 
medical providers’ lien recoveries); see also Alaska Native, 84 P.3d at 434–35 (quoting Martinez, 871 
P.2d at 1367) (agreeing with the New Mexico Supreme Court’s analysis in Martinez in holding that 
the work of the plaintiff’s attorney is critical to the collectability of medical liens). For the New Mexi-
co Supreme Court, the fact that a medical provider has a creditor-debtor arrangement with the plaintiff 
patient means that the provider would ordinarily employ its own attorneys to collect an outstanding 
debt from the plaintiff. Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367. The fact that this necessity to collection is sup-
planted by the plaintiff’s hiring of legal counsel to secure a tort settlement means that the work of that 
counsel must also be necessary to the medical provider. See id. (holding that if a required element of 
collection is replaced by an alternative method, the alternative method cannot be attendant to collec-
tion). The Supreme Court of Alaska agrees. See Alaska Native, 84 P.3d at 435 (noting that medical 
lienholders are indistinguishable from subrogees in that both require the creation of a Common Fund 
to exercise their rights to payment). 
 143 See Alaska Native, 84 P.3d at 435–36 (quoting Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367) (following the 
New Mexico Supreme Court’s rationale in Martinez in holding that medical lienholders cannot, in all 
fairness, benefit in the manner that they do from the work of the plaintiff’s attorney and not contribute 
towards the payment of legal fees and costs). Especially critical to the minority view’s evaluation is 
the idea that without an enforceable lien, the medical provider would need to utilize its own re-
sources—legal or otherwise—at its own expense, to collect on the debt the injured plaintiff owes. See 
id. at 435 (quoting Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367) (noting that the plaintiff hiring an attorney saves the 
medical provider from having to incur its own legal costs to enforce its lien). The minority view is 
consequently wary of the slippery slope that it feels the majority view fails to anticipate: that without 
having to contribute a proportionate share of the legal fees necessary to procure a settlement, medical 
lienholders take advantage of a specific debt-recovery model at the expense of their own patients. See 
Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367 (reasoning that the majority view encourages medical lienholders to do 
nothing in enforcing their liens because plaintiffs’ attorneys, for which medical lienholders do not 
have to pay, do all the necessary legal work). 
2648 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2619 
Second, the minority view has provided an alternative perspective on the 
creditor-debtor issue.144 Where the majority view holds that the medical pro-
vider is a creditor whose right to payment exists autonomously of whether the 
plaintiff pursues a tort action, the minority view emphasizes the importance of 
the medical provider expressing that right to payment via the lien process.145 In 
the minority view, a medical provider’s right to reimbursement as effectuated 
against an individual is not particularly useful.146 Alternatively, a medical lien 
asserted against a pending insurance payout is very useful.147 Thus, independ-
ent of the attachment requirements of a particular lien statute, the settlement 
grants the medical provider a reasonable expectation of payment.148 For the 
minority view, it is not the source of the plaintiff’s debt obligation to the medi-
cal provider that is important.149 Instead, the work of the plaintiff’s attorney, 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See Yaeger v. City of Lincoln (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bloomquist), 523 
N.W.2d 352, 360 (Neb. 1994) (illustrating the Nebraska Supreme Court’s unique perspective on how 
the medical lienholder, although not engaging with the tort settlement in the same manner as a subro-
gee, nonetheless heavily relies on the efforts of the plaintiff’s attorney). 
 145 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1366–67 (noting the provider’s decision to collect via filing a lien, 
an effort that requires a settlement to have any effect, in turn requires the work of the plaintiff’s attor-
ney); Schulte, supra note 16, at 1777 (citing Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1366–67) (summarizing the Mar-
tinez court’s methodology as focusing not on the provider’s right to payment, but rather on the means 
by which it chose to collect). Compare Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360 (noting that medical lien cases 
often involve patients who have no ability to pay for their medical treatment short of recovering a tort 
settlement), with Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1103 (providing the 
majority position that medical lienholders are creditors of the injured plaintiffs and therefore not de-
pendent on the tort settlement). The minority view holds that hospital lien statutes provide a source of 
recovery for debts that would otherwise be unrecoverable. Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360. The minority 
view notes that, although the medical lien statute does not represent a positive boon in equity terms, it 
does present a process that serves medical providers, and to which medical providers should therefore 
contribute remuneration. Id. 
 146 See Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360. (describing a filed medical lien without the potential for a tort 
settlement as “worthless”). The court notes that the attachment requirements of medical lien statutes, 
specifically that the plaintiff must pursue a judgment or settlement for medical liens to attach, places 
medical lienholders in the same position as subrogees from a practical standpoint. See id. (noting that 
although medical lienholders do not technically replace the plaintiff as beneficiary to the settlement 
funds, medical lienholders are equally as reliant on the plaintiff’s attorney as the plaintiff). 
 147 See id. (noting that a medical provider has no incentive to assert a lien except where its patient 
decides to pursue a liability action against a tortfeasor). The implication the minority view makes does 
not simply engage the fact that hospital lien statutes impose provisions requiring a tort settlement to 
attach. Id. Rather, it extends to the idea that medical providers have no reason at all to try to collect 
from these patients absent a settlement. See id. (reasoning that these types of account debts represent 
little chance of collection for medical providers, and medical providers otherwise simply adjust these 
debts off their accounts receivable). 
 148 See id. (implying that the settlements cannot occur without the work of the plaintiff’s attorney, 
and that medical liens provide no benefit to medical lienholders if the plaintiff does not receive a set-
tlement). 
 149 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1367 (disregarding the actual source of the plaintiff’s debt obliga-
tion with the medical provider in favor of emphasizing the importance of the plaintiff’s attorney’s 
work in securing a settlement to effectuate the medical provider’s lien). 
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which provides the lien with collectability, should induce the medical provider 
to pay a proportionate share of the attorney’s fees.150 
C. The Academic Position: The Doctrine Helps Solve Equity Issues and 
Provides Incentive for Patients to Pursue Tortfeasors 
Although many courts have long settled the issue of whether applying the 
Doctrine to reduce medical provider liens is appropriate within their jurisdic-
tions, there remains a call within the legal community for courts to adopt the 
minority position.151 Plaintiffs’ attorneys still bring the issue to the courts and 
vigorously challenge lower courts who side with the majority view.152 Legal 
academics have implored the courts to reconsider applying the Doctrine to im-
pose proportionate sharing of attorney’s fees upon medical lienholders.153 Aca-
demics have also pushed for state legislatures to amend medical lien statutes to 
ensure that the policy of preventing unjust enrichment at the root of the Doc-
trine has legal effect.154 
                                                                                                                           
 150 See Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360–61 (holding that, although the medical lienholder does not 
actually supplant the plaintiff as a claimant to settlement funds, as a subrogee would, the medical 
lienholder is utterly reliant upon the plaintiff’s attorney to provide funds for the medical provider to 
collect). 
 151 See, e.g., Ellison, supra note 12, at 328 (petitioning for greater adoption of the Doctrine in tort 
settlements); Reynolds, supra note 10, at 137 (lobbying for several policies pertaining to medical liens 
that would increase the percentage of tort settlements that patients would actually pocket, including 
broader application of the Doctrine). 
 152 See, e.g., Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1096 (providing an 
example of plaintiffs’ attorneys bringing a class action complaint on the issue of the applicability of 
the Doctrine to tort settlements all the way to the Utah Supreme Court as recently as 2018). 
 153 See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 136–37 (arguing that courts should reconsider application of 
the Doctrine, in addition to other solutions, to guarantee equitable outcomes for plaintiffs). These 
arguments favor common law use of the Doctrine, given the difficulties inherent in effecting change 
through the legislature. Id. 
 154 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 326–27 (arguing that the Illinois legislature must change the 
Illinois Health Care Service Lien Act to include a provision requiring medical lienholders to reduce 
the lien to share in the plaintiff’s legal fees). But see Schulte, supra note 16, at 1789 (arguing that state 
legislatures should change their respective medical lien laws specifically to prohibit use of the Doc-
trine to impose automatic reductions of medical liens to pay a share of attorney’s fees). One argument 
specifies that medical lienholders would need to reduce their liens only where plaintiffs’ attorneys 
were successful in obtaining a financial recovery from tortfeasors. Ellison, supra note 12, at 327. The 
rationale behind implicating the Doctrine only where the attorney secures a money remedy is simple: 
because the medical lien secures a financial obligation the plaintiff has with the medical provider, a 
financial award is the only means by which a plaintiff’s attorney’s efforts can bestow a benefit upon 
the medical provider. See id. at 322 (describing the benefit requirement of unjust enrichment in Illi-
nois and noting that both ways in which a medical lienholder can enjoy unjust enrichment by not con-
tributing to a plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees—either because the lienholder receives money or because it is 
able to discharge a debt—require the attorney to obtain a judgment from the tortfeasor). Prior to the 
call for re-examination of the Doctrine as it pertains to hospital liens, which more recent scholarship 
has partially followed, the early scholarship on this issue argued that lawmakers, particularly in states 
where courts had not ruled on the issue, should plainly indicate whether their medical lien statutes 
impose a fee sharing requirement on providers. See id. at 327–28 (arguing for amendment of the Illi-
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In evaluating the body of case law on the issue, the academic community 
has embraced the unjust enrichment argument and maintains that applying the 
Doctrine would be an effective way to prevent medical providers from realiz-
ing unjust enrichment.155 Central to this argument is the idea that in collecting 
the full amount of their liens while not sharing the plaintiff’s legal fees, medi-
cal providers co-opt lien statutes to seize an advantage at the expense of the 
plaintiff.156 In addition to questions of fairness, the scholarship poses a related, 
yet far more damaging, consequence of this scheme.157 If injured patients can-
not recover sufficient compensation for their injuries, they have no incentive to 
endure the challenges of pursuing the tortfeasor at all.158 Such a decision, in 
                                                                                                                           
nois Health Care Service Lien Act to effectuate the Doctrine in specified circumstances); Reynolds, 
supra note 10, at 136–37 (agreeing that lienholders should contribute to attorney’s fees, but arguing 
that to impose such a requirement courts should simply reconsider applying the Doctrine rather than 
rely on a prolonged legislative process); Schulte, supra note 16, at 1784–85 (arguing that clarifying 
the issue through statutory amendment is necessary because courts in multiple states have ruled on 
opposite sides of the debate). The early scholarship further argued against forcing medical providers 
to contribute to plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, citing providers’ important role in treating the uninsured 
and the valuable protections that lien statutes afford providers as important justifications for this posi-
tion. See Schulte, supra note 16, at 1785–88 (illustrating the important public policy ramifications of 
imposing additional financial burdens on hospitals that treat many patients who have no means to pay 
and that rely substantially on the protections and collection avenues lien statutes afford). 
 155 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 321–27 (arguing that the scenario of a medical lienholder recov-
ering a debt by asserting a lien without paying a proportionate share of the plaintiff’s legal fees meets 
each of the three elements of unjust enrichment in Illinois, and that applying the Doctrine would elim-
inate it). The Illinois Supreme Court has identified three factors for unjust enrichment. Id. at 321. 
First, the defendant to an unjust enrichment claim obtains some form of gain. Id. Second, the gain the 
defendant realizes must come at the disadvantage of the plaintiff. Id. Finally, the defendant’s preserva-
tion of its gain must affront fundamental notions of legal fairness. Id. Critical to the argument that 
medical lienholders enjoy unjust enrichment in tort settlements is an examination of what constitutes a 
gain within a state’s unjust enrichment paradigm. See id. (initiating the argument that medical 
lienholders receive unjust enrichment by looking to Illinois case law for guidance on what constitutes 
a gain). Where the common law has not specifically stated what constitutes gain within an unjust 
enrichment scenario, practitioners can look to the courts for illustrations of what can meet the stand-
ard. See id. at 321–22 (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court has not given specific direction on what 
amounts to gain, so case law from the lower courts provides the only possible direction). Especially 
pertinent to the case of a medical lienholder, at least one state has established that when the defendant 
to an unjust enrichment claim either receives a monetary benefit or the plaintiff precludes the defend-
ant from suffering monetary forfeiture, that meets the gain requirement. Id. at 322. 
 156 See id. at 322–26 (discussing unjust enrichment to medical providers who assert liens without 
paying a proportionate share of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees). 
 157 See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 135–36 (noting that excessive costs incident to both treatment 
and settlement can impact the financial forecasts and calculations an injured plaintiff must make in 
determining whether to sue). 
 158 See id. (discussing the factors that plaintiffs consider in deciding to sue). Courts holding the 
minority position have also considered whether litigation is cost prohibitive to plaintiffs if lienholders 
do not contribute to a plaintiffs’ legal expenses. See Yaeger v. City of Lincoln (In re Guardianship & 
Conservatorship of Bloomquist), 523 N.W.2d 352, 360 (Neb. 1994) (discussing how some tort victims 
may see no point in pursuing a tortfeasor if their damages are in excess of the tortfeasor’s insurance 
coverage). Suing a tortfeasor can cost injured patients significant amounts of money. Reynolds, supra 
note 10, at 135–36. The American Rule dictates that, absent special circumstances, litigants must bear 
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the aggregate, would have a negative impact on the injured persons and signif-
icantly diminish the remedies available at law to both injured parties and to the 
medical providers who treat them.159 
III. CHALLENGING THE MINORITY POSITION: DECONSTRUCTING THE 
ARGUMENTS FOR APPLYING THE COMMON FUND DOCTRINE  
TO MEDICAL LIENHOLDERS IN TORT SETTLEMENTS 
Proponents of the minority position assert several arguments in claiming 
that courts should apply the Doctrine to reduce medical liens in tort settle-
ments.160 Section A of this Part challenges the argument that fundamental prin-
ciples of fairness dictate that medical providers should pay a proportionate 
share of attorney’s fees.161 Section B challenges the assertion that the only way 
a medical lienholder can recover payments from tort settlements is through the 
work of a plaintiff’s attorney, and therefore that medical lienholders should 
contribute to attorney’s fees.162 Section C challenges the argument that medical 
lien statutes exist primarily to mitigate the concern providers have about treat-
ing patients with no ability to pay by guaranteeing at least a partial recovery.163 
                                                                                                                           
their own costs of litigation. See id. at 135 (noting that the standard in the United States is for litigants 
to manage their own legal expenses); see also Ellison, supra note 12, at 316 (discussing American 
litigants’ responsibility for paying their own legal fees, except in unique circumstances). Thus, in 
deciding whether to sue, an injured plaintiff must understand how much settlement money is poten-
tially available, and how much of that settlement money will remain after paying legal fees and both 
secured and unsecured debts. See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 135–36 (noting that the cost of litigation 
is considerable and that the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act permits medical lienholders to 
pursue from the injured plaintiff any portion of their lien not resolved in the settlement). One argu-
ment in favor of applying the Doctrine to compel medical providers to contribute a proportionate 
share of attorney’s fees is that doing so would increase the likelihood of the injured plaintiff pocketing 
at least some of the settlement funds. See id. at 115–16, 135–36 (discussing the cost of pursuing a 
tortfeasor as a significant impediment to some accident victims, and the role the Doctrine has in ap-
portioning at least some of those costs). This would likely increase the number of plaintiffs who might 
seek tort settlements as a remedy. See id. at 137 (suggesting that use of the Doctrine would improve 
the likelihood of positive results for tort plaintiffs). 
 159 See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 138 (expressing the need for legislative action in Illinois to 
minimize negative financial outcomes for injured plaintiffs in tort actions). 
 160 See, e.g., Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1367 (N.M. 1994) (holding 
that medical lienholders are reliant on the work of the plaintiff’s attorney to secure a settlement, and 
thus should contribute a proportionate share of attorney’s fees); Ellison, supra note 12, at 308–09 
(arguing that the main thrust of medical lien statutes is to grant medical providers security in treating 
uninsured patients, not to guarantee full recovery for billed charges); Reynolds, supra note 10, at 137 
(arguing that courts should re-analyze the Doctrine from the vantage point of what is most fair to the 
plaintiff). 
 161 See infra notes 164–183 and accompanying text. 
 162 See infra notes 184–200 and accompanying text. 
 163 See infra notes 201–208 and accompanying text. 
2652 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2619 
A. The Fairness Argument: Equity Principles Dictate that Medical 
Lienholders Should Contribute to the Plaintiff’s Legal Fees 
Both case law and legal scholarship that push for the adoption of the mi-
nority position maintain that fundamental principles of fairness and the elimi-
nation of unjust enrichment dictate that medical lienholders should pay a pro-
portionate share of the legal fees incurred to generate a tort settlement.164 This 
argument derives from the idea that the injured plaintiff incurs substantial risk 
in filing suit and the plaintiff’s attorney confers a unique and considerable ben-
efit upon the medical lienholder, for which the medical lienholder ultimately 
does not pay.165 Such a result, proponents argue, is inherently and facially in-
equitable.166 
The fairness position overlooks the fact that applying the Doctrine to 
force medical lienholders into reducing their liens results in inequitable out-
comes.167 Many state medical lien statutes already impose a cap on the amount 
medical liens can secure from a tort settlement, notwithstanding the amount 
the plaintiff patient owes to the treating provider.168 To impose an additional 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See, e.g., Yaeger v. City of Lincoln (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bloomquist), 
523 N.W.2d 352, 360–61 (Neb. 1994) (holding that because medical lienholders are completely reli-
ant on the plaintiff’s attorney’s work to recover on their liens, fairness dictates that medical lienhold-
ers should contribute an equitable share of attorney’s fees); Ellison, supra note 12, at 325–26 (imply-
ing that medical lienholders who do not pay a fair portion of attorney’s fees are parasitically impacting 
injured plaintiffs); see also Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1366 (distinguishing the fairness argument from the 
unjust enrichment argument in the context of applying the Doctrine to a hospital lien). For further 
discussion of the fairness justification in comparison to the unjust enrichment justification, see supra 
note 99 and accompanying text. 
 165 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 321–26 (discussing how the work of the plaintiff’s attorney 
confers upon medical lienholders an advantage that meets the benefit requirement of unjust enrich-
ment as defined in Illinois). Proponents of applying the Doctrine to medical lienholders in tort settle-
ments point to two distinct benefits the injured plaintiff’s attorney provides to medical lienholders. See 
id. at 322 (enumerating what the Illinois courts have identified as conferring a benefit in unjust en-
richment claims). First, these proponents argue the work of the plaintiff’s attorney provides medical 
lienholders with a financial award that technically belongs to the injured plaintiff. Id. Second, the 
work of the plaintiff’s attorney amounts to the plaintiff resolving a debt owed to medical lienholders, 
providing medical lienholders with resolution of an outstanding legal obligation. Id. 
 166 See, e.g., Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for or to Be Paid 
on Behalf of E.R. ex rel. Ridley, 84 P.3d 418, 436 (Alaska 2004) (holding that medical lienholders 
who do not pay a proportionate share of the legal expenses injured plaintiffs incur to facilitate tort 
settlements receive unjust enrichment); Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360 (noting that medical lienholders 
should not receive the benefits of the plaintiff’s legal representation without contributing to the costs 
of that representation); Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1366 (holding the application of the Doctrine to medical 
lienholders in tort actions is a very fitting means of ensuring essential justice and an equitable out-
come). 
 167 See, e.g., Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1103 (implying that 
it is unfair to require a medical provider to help pay for the plaintiff’s attorney because the plaintiff 
owes the medical provider a debt whether or not the plaintiff hires an attorney or even pursues a tort 
settlement at all). 
 168 See, e.g., 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10(a) (2020) (limiting the aggregate charges of all liens of 
a settlement to 40% of the total settlement amount); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 55.004(b) (West 2021) 
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forced reduction upon medical lienholders to contribute to attorney’s fees 
would produce a double recovery for the plaintiff patient, resulting in a statuto-
rily-generated windfall.169 Even where medical lien statutes don’t cap the 
amount a lien may recover, they frequently include priority provisions that es-
tablish that funds secured in tort settlements must first pay the plaintiff’s legal 
fees before reimbursing any other lienholder or secured creditor.170 Combining 
statutory priority rights with mandatory contributions to attorney’s fees for 
medical lienholders would place medical lienholders in an inequitably disad-
vantageous position.171 
                                                                                                                           
(capping hospital liens either to charges pertaining to the first one hundred days of treatment follow-
ing an accident, or to half the plaintiff’s entire tort recovery, or to the amount, minus attorney’s fees, 
that the fact-finder sets aside for medical services, whichever is less); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-66.2 
(2015 & Supp. 2021) (capping hospital liens to $2,500, regardless of the extent of charges the patient 
accrues); see also McVey v. M.L.K. Enters., L.L.C., 2015 IL 118143, 32 N.E.3d 1112, 1117 (discuss-
ing how improper application of the Doctrine in tort settlements where the applicable lien statute caps 
the amount medical lienholders can secure through their liens can result in an inappropriate recovery 
to the plaintiff at the expense of medical lienholders). 
 169 See, e.g., Maynard v. Parker, 387 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Ill. 1979) (identifying the statutory cap on 
lien recoveries as a significant consideration in the court’s decision not to apply the Doctrine). Courts 
have recognized the potential for medical lienholders to incur double reductions even where courts 
have ultimately applied the Doctrine to compel medical lienholders to contribute to plaintiff’s attor-
ney’s fees. See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1365–66 (noting that the New Mexico Supreme Court felt justi-
fied in breaking with the Illinois Supreme Court because the Illinois Health Care Service Lien Act 
caps medical lien recovery to a specific maximum percentage of the total settlement, whereas the New 
Mexico hospital lien statute does not). Such courts have held that legislatures that imposed a cap with-
in their medical lien statutes did not want medical lienholders to experience additional reductions to 
the cap. Id. at 1366. Thus, courts do not apply the Doctrine in those jurisdictions. See id. (applying 
legislative intent to distinguish New Mexico’s application of the Doctrine in tort settlements from 
Illinois’s rejection of the Doctrine). 
 170 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(1)(a)–(b) (West 2018) (establishing that medical liens in 
Utah attach to the portion of the injured plaintiff’s settlement that remains after the plaintiff’s attorney 
deducts their fees). Plaintiffs’ attorneys in Utah have challenged the attachment language of Utah’s 
hospital lien statute, contending that the language does not establish priority to attorney liens, but 
rather requires medical providers to automatically deduct from their liens an amount equal to the sum 
the plaintiff pays in legal fees. See, e.g., Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1098 (illustrating the plaintiff’s argument 
that the attachment language of Utah’s hospital lien statute establishes a reduction requirement for 
medical liens, not priority for attorney’s fees). The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed. See id. 1102 
(holding that for an interpretation of the attachment provision of Utah’s hospital lien statute to impose 
an automatic reduction of medical liens to contribute to plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees, the interpretation 
would need to add significantly to the statutory language). 
 171 See Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1102 (illustrating the Utah legislature’s anticipation of the inequity 
that results from granting priority to attorney’s fees and imposing a fee sharing requirement on medi-
cal lienholders). The Utah Supreme Court adeptly recognized that imposing priority to attorney liens 
itself constitutes a reduction of the amount a lienholder may recover from a settlement, and that a fee 
sharing requirement would amount to an additional reduction. See id. (noting that the attachment lan-
guage of Utah’s hospital lien statute allows for plaintiffs’ attorneys to take their fee before any medi-
cal lienholders receive payment, but permits no additional decrease to a medical provider’s enforce-
ment of its lien without the medical provider’s consent); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(1)(a)–
(b) (providing the Utah hospital lien statute’s attachment language that grants priority to attorney’s 
fees over a medical lien, but does not permit any further lien reductions absent the lienholder’s con-
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Proponents of imposing a mandatory contribution to attorney’s fees upon 
lienholders also point to prevention of unjust enrichment as justification, but 
such a rationale is unpersuasive.172 Unjust enrichment requires a receiving par-
ty to benefit, without providing reimbursement, where it was reasonable for the 
conferring party to anticipate reimbursement.173 In general, it is not reasonable 
for a tort plaintiff to expect a medical lienholder to provide pro-rata reim-
bursement for attorney’s fees because the American Rule holds that litigants 
pay their own legal fees absent exceptional scenarios.174 Where common law 
                                                                                                                           
sent). A hypothetical, derived from the author’s personal experience negotiating medical provider 
liens on behalf of hospitals, is helpful to illustrate how this works. A plaintiff has a single medical bill 
for $50,000 and hires an attorney to resolve her tort claim. The relevant medical lien statute establish-
es that medical provider liens attach only to the portion of the settlement that remains after the injured 
party pays the attorney. If the available settlement is, for example, $100,000, the attorney would take a 
presumptive 33% of the settlement amount, meaning that the lien would attach to the remaining 
$66,666.67. This is more than enough to cover the medical provider’s full lien amount, and so there is 
no compounded disadvantage to the medical provider if a court applies the Doctrine to impose a fee 
sharing reduction of the medical lien. Contrastingly, if the settlement amount is, for example, 
$50,000—the same amount as the lien—then there is a concerted impact resulting in a double reduc-
tion of the medical lien. The attorney would still take a presumptive 33% of the settlement, meaning 
the medical lien would attach to the $33,333.33 that remains. This automatically reduces the medical 
provider lien from $50,000 to $33,333.33. If a court then applies a fee sharing requirement, the medi-
cal provider will need to reduce its lien again, presumably by another 33% to $22,222.22, all while the 
lien statute completely entitles the attorney to take their full fee. The lower the total settlement amount 
gets, the worse this scheme becomes for lienholders, without impacting the attorney’s prospects for 
remuneration at all. 
 172 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 321 (noting that a principal objective of the Doctrine is to offset 
unjust enrichment); see also Lynch v. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 776 P.2d 681, 683 (Wash. 1989) (discuss-
ing the plaintiff’s contention that a reduction of the defendant’s medical lien was necessary to coun-
teract unjust enrichment). 
 173 Unjust Enrichment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 18. 
 174 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 316 (citing Morris B. Chapman & Assocs., Ltd. v. Kitzman, 739 
N.E.2d 1263, 1271 (Ill. 2000)) (noting that successful suit against a liable party typically does not 
include reimbursement for legal expenses). Exceptions include circumstances where either the parties 
agree to fee-shift or a statutory provision grants fee-shifting. Id. Medical lien statutes do not generally 
include explicit language regarding fee-shifting, though courts have evaluated use of the Doctrine 
where lien statutes do not stipulate what constitutes full payment of the lien. See, e.g., Martinez, 871 
P.2d at 1366 (noting that the court was not bound, as other state courts were, to render a decision 
regarding use of the Doctrine based purely on the language of the state medical lien statute). Plaintiffs 
negotiate attorney fees at the time of contract, with a contingency fee based on a percentage of monies 
recovered being a common model in tort cases. See David Goguen, Lawyers’ Fees in Your Personal 
Injury Case, ALLLAW, https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/lawyers-fees.html [https://
perma.cc/B6QF-RAC7] (indicating that contingency fee pricing structures for legal fees are common 
in personal injury suits, and that such fees often range from 33% to 40% of the amount the attorney 
secures in settlement). Such an arrangement incentivizes the attorney to obtain the highest possible 
settlement so that the attorney can realize the highest possible fee. See Ellison, supra note 12, at 318 
(discussing the monetary incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys when courts applying the Doctrine calcu-
late the legal fees based on a percentage of the settlement award). At least one court has noted that 
medical providers have no say in which attorney the plaintiff hires to settle the case, and for what fee 
arrangement. See Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646, 651–52 (Ill. 2011) (illustrating the 
hospital’s lack of decision-making authority in acquiring legal services for which the plaintiff expects 
the medical provider to pay). 
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has expanded upon the general definition of unjust enrichment to include in-
stances where one party receives a gain at the expense of another party, unjust 
enrichment still does not provide justification for medical lien reductions.175 
The plaintiff owes a debt to the medical provider for services rendered.176 The 
medical provider receives a gain when the plaintiff’s attorney pays its lien us-
ing settlement funds.177 The payment of that debt, however, comes at the plain-
tiff ’s benefit as well, not at the plaintiff’s impairment.178 
The minority position seeks to circumvent the American Rule problem by 
imposing the Doctrine, citing the goal of averting freeriding for support.179 
Courts have defined freeriding in this context as gaining from the creation of a 
common fund without participating in the process to obtain it.180 Medical 
lienholders do not freeride because they contribute to securing the settlement.181 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 321 (citing HPI Health Care Servs., Inc., v. Mount Vernon 
Hosp., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ill. 1989)) (providing the Illinois Supreme Court’s definition of 
unjust enrichment). 
 176 See, e.g., Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103 (noting that medical providers acquire a right to payment 
upon administering treatment to the plaintiff patient). 
 177 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 322 (discussing the different categories of gain and how recov-
ery of a lien-secured debt qualifies). Though the medical provider’s receipt of a gain is undisputed for 
the purposes of this specific point, whether the provider does in fact receive a gain, and if so, what 
type of gain, is a foundational topic of the debate. Compare Wendling, 950 N.E.2d at 651 (noting that 
because the plaintiff owed the debt to the hospital regardless of whether the plaintiff successfully sued 
the tortfeasor, payment of the lien via settlement funds was merely a supplementary gain to the hospi-
tal), with Ellison, supra note 12, at 322 (arguing that the hospital receives a gain, either because it 
receives cash value on its lien, or because it receives the discharge of a debt liability). 
 178 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 322 (discussing the various categories of “benefit” under the 
Illinois Supreme Court’s definition of unjust enrichment). Here, the minority argument folds in on 
itself. See id. (noting that one form of “benefit” under the Illinois definition of unjust enrichment is the 
elimination of a debt obligation). The minority position argues that the medical provider lienholder 
receives a gain from the plaintiff’s attorney because the attorney’s efforts produce a settlement that 
pays off the debt the lien secures. Id. By that rationale, the plaintiff must also gain, because the plain-
tiff owns the debt obligation. See Wendling, 950 N.E.2d at 651 (noting that the plaintiff is ultimately 
responsible for payment of the hospital claim). It is unpersuasive to argue that the elimination of the 
debt obligation is simultaneously a gain to the hospital and an impairment to the plaintiff, when reso-
lution of the lien debt is an objective of both parties in pursuing their respective claims against the 
tortfeasor. See Ellison, supra note 12, at 322 (arguing that the settlement permits the hospital to re-
solve the debt, constituting a gain). 
 179 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 326 (citing Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Baron, 964 F. Supp. 
1221, 1224 (N.D. Ill. 1997)) (maintaining that courts apply the Doctrine to stop lien claimants from 
freeriding). 
 180 See, e.g., Brase ex rel. Brase v. Loempker, 642 N.E.2d 202, 204–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) 
(providing the elements necessary to apply the Doctrine to demonstrate the Doctrine’s basis in the 
prevention of freeriding). 
 181 See, e.g., Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1364 (N.M. 1994) (providing 
an example of a medical lienholder having a considerable impact on the amount of the settlement 
offer). Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare System provides a fact pattern that illustrates the impact a 
medical lien can have on securing a settlement. Id. The uninsured motorist policy tendered its full 
limits of over $100,000. Id. The total medical debt was over $63,000, including a hospital lien secur-
ing nearly $30,000. Id. Were it not for the considerable amount of medical debt, nearly half of which 
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Medical providers treat patients, calculate charges for services, and file liens, at 
their own expense, to assist the plaintiff in proving damages and generating a 
demand to the insurance company.182 Attempting to impose the Doctrine on a 
medical provider simply because the provider asserted its right to payment as a 
claim against a liable insurance company instead of against the plaintiff repre-
sents a fundamentally misguided appropriation of the concept of freeriding.183 
B. The Savior Argument: Because Medical Providers Would Have No 
Source of Recovery Without the Work of the Plaintiff’s Attorney,  
They Should Contribute to the Plaintiff’s Legal Fees 
Proponents of the minority position argue that medical lienholders should 
reduce their liens to contribute a share of the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees because 
plaintiffs’ attorneys establish medical lienholders’ only reasonably reliable 
source of reimbursement.184 Such an assertion is untrue and a significant exag-
geration.185 Tort settlements occur regularly without plaintiffs ever hiring an 
attorney.186 Further, tort settlements are not the only source of recovery for a 
                                                                                                                           
derived from a single hospital lien, it is questionable, if not unlikely, that the insurance company 
would have tendered the full policy limits. See id. (illustrating that the entirety of the plaintiff’s claim 
against the insurance company consisted of medical debt, attorney’s fees and expenses, and a small 
funeral expense claim). Notably, given a contingency fee arrangement with the plaintiff, the attorney 
benefitted enormously from the settlement offer, absorbing over $38,000 in fees and other expenses 
before reductions, the most of any claimant against the settlement. Id. 
 182 See, e.g., id. (illustrating a medical provider’s efforts to treat a patient, compile charges, and 
assert a lien against the patient’s pending tort settlement); see also supra note 181 and accompanying 
text. Notably, the courts recognize that filing a lien is not the only recourse a medical provider has for 
recovering its debt from the plaintiff; the medical provider has other options. See, e.g., Bryner v. Car-
don Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1103 (noting that a medical provider is not de-
pendent on the lien process to collect on its debt). For example, the medical provider could forego 
filing a lien and pursuing the settlement, choosing instead to treat the debt as a financial adjustment. 
Yaeger v. City of Lincoln (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bloomquist), 523 N.W.2d 352, 
360 (Neb. 1994). Should a hospital choose to adjust a debt rather than file a lien to collect on it, the 
plaintiff loses the value of the lien in proving damages to the tortfeasor’s insurance company. See 
Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1364 (providing the details of a tort suit where the amount of medical debt in-
formed the extent of the settlement offer); see also supra note 181 and accompanying text (summariz-
ing the impact of the lien adjustment in Martinez on the settlement amount). 
 183 See Brase, 642 N.E.2d at 204–05 (holding that proper imposition of the Doctrine requires a 
party to gain from the work of the plaintiff’s attorney without themselves contributing to the settle-
ment). 
 184 See, e.g., Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360 (noting that asserting a medical lien against a patient is 
generally fruitless). The minority position further contends that because the plaintiff’s attorney effec-
tuates the medical lien by securing a tort settlement, the medical lienholder is hypothetically, if not 
statutorily, indebted to the attorney. Id. 
 185 See, e.g., Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103 (noting that asserting a medical lien is only one of several 
ways a medical provider can seek to collect a tort-related debt from a patient); see also Reynolds, 
supra note 10, at 118–21 (establishing that medical providers have other, insurance-based options for 
reimbursement independent of the providers’ rights to assert liens). 
 186 See Engstrom, supra note 54, at 299 (providing that approximately half of all automobile acci-
dent victims who pursue a tortfeasor for damages do so without retaining an attorney); David Goguen, 
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medical provider seeking reimbursement for treatment of accident-related inju-
ries.187 Medical lien statutes often preclude medical providers from asserting 
liens until providers have exhausted other sources of recovery, and thus antici-
pate that providers will file liens for less than their total charges.188 The Af-
fordable Care Act provides a marketplace for various health insurance plans, 
and state legislatures have subsequently established state-based individual 
mandates for minimum essential health insurance coverage.189 Thus, the argu-
ment that medical providers are reliant on the efforts of personal injury attor-
neys to avoid poor financial outcomes where the provider’s patient is a tort 
victim is outdated and mischaracterizes medical providers’ other options.190 
                                                                                                                           
Negotiating a Personal Injury Settlement Without a Lawyer, ALLLAW, https://www.alllaw.com/
articles/nolo/personal-injury/negotiating-accident-settlement-without-lawyer.html#:~:text=It’s%20
certainly%20possible%20to%20represent,for%20yourself%20and%20your%20case [https://perma.
cc/F7HD-6LQC] (providing tips to injured parties on when to consider hiring legal counsel to settle 
accident claims, and when to attempt to settle such claims without retaining representation). Settling a 
tort claim without an attorney is especially worthy of consideration where the damages are not sub-
stantial and where there is no dispute as to liability. Goguen, supra. 
 187 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 188 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(3)(a)–(b) (West 2018) (establishing that medical provid-
ers in Utah may not assert liens upon accident-related debts that are reimbursable from a patient’s 
health insurance plan or workers’ compensation plan, except where the patient’s health insurance plan 
either denies coverage of services charged or does not issue payment within six months of billing); see 
also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-27-101(1)–(2) (West 2021) (establishing that a medical pro-
vider must seek payment from an injured patient’s principal health insurance coverage before the 
medical provider may assert a lien under Colorado law). The assumption accompanying a statute’s 
disallowance of lien filing until after a provider exhausts all other sources of recovery is that providers 
will file liens only for the self-pay portion of bills that remain after another insurance plan has covered 
the rest. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(3)(b)(ii)–(iii) (providing Utah’s rule that a provider 
cannot file a lien if a health plan has issued payment according to its contractual rates, except for co-
pay and deductible balances). 
 189 See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2018) (providing the Affordable Care Act’s requirement for all 
states to establish a marketplace from which citizens can purchase qualified health insurance cover-
age; see also, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100705(a)–(b) (West 2021) (establishing California’s state 
individual health insurance mandate); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-5102(a) (West 2020) (establishing same 
for the District of Columbia); 44 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-101(b) (2010 & Supp. 2020) (establishing 
same for Rhode Island). Generally speaking, states identify government-funded health plans, includ-
ing Medicare and Medicaid, most health plans offered through a subscriber’s employer, and individual 
coverage purchased through the Affordable Care Act’s exchange marketplaces as qualifying as mini-
mum essential coverage. See, e.g., GOV’T § 100710(g) (citing California’s definition of minimum 
essential coverage in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1345.5 (West 2021)); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-
5101(11) (illustrating that DC’s definition tracks the federal definition in 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f), with 
several additions); 44 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-101(a)(2) (illustrating that Rhode Island’s definition 
also tracks to the federal definition). 
 190 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(3) (establishing that asserting a lien against an injured plain-
tiff’s liability settlement cannot possibly be the sole source of recovery for medical providers who 
treat accident victims because the Utah hospital lien statute identifies several types of insurance cov-
erage that medical providers must pursue before they may assert a lien). This is not to suggest, how-
ever, that the ability to file liens is immaterial to a medical provider’s collection strategy; to the con-
trary, liens provide far greater hope for recovery of uninsured “self-pay” debts than simply billing 
patients for them. See Schulte, supra note 16, at 1787 (identifying liens as a critical tool in self-pay 
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Those holding to the minority position often contend that medical 
lienholders who do not want to contribute to the legal costs associated with 
settling tort actions are free to disengage in the active proceedings and simply 
file a lien and await payment.191 Such an assertion trivializes the costs and 
risks medical providers assume in filing liens and the adverse impact personal 
injury attorneys can have on medical providers’ share of tort settlements.192 To 
file a lien generally represents a significant break with a medical provider’s 
normal financial management practices and can require the medical provider to 
wait months or years for a recovery that may never come.193 Further, especially 
where settlement funds are extremely limited in comparison to accident-related 
debts, the hiring of a personal injury attorney can generate less reimbursement 
to providers because funds that were scarce to begin with must now also cover 
                                                                                                                           
collections). It is true that medical lien statutes frequently preclude filing of liens when other coverage 
is available to pay, meaning that often providers only file liens with respect to patients who, without 
recourse against the tortfeasor’s liability coverage, are otherwise uninsured. See id. (discussing liens 
as an important tool in a provider’s collection process against uninsured and underinsured patients); 
see also supra note 188 and accompanying text (providing examples of hospital lien statutes that pre-
clude lien filing when a patient has other available coverage and discussing the rationale behind such 
limitations). That said, “uninsured” in this context can mean that a patient lacks coverage, but it can 
also mean that a patient has coverage but that coverage has denied payment. See, e.g., UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 38-7-1(3)(b)(i) (establishing that medical providers in Utah can assert liens either when a 
patient’s health insurance plan has either denied payment or simply has not responded to the provid-
er’s request for payment 180 days after billing). In these scenarios, the lien still does not represent the 
provider’s sole source of recovery, as the minority position contends, even if it is the best one; the 
provider may still appeal the health insurance plan’s denial or pursue the patient directly. See id. (im-
plying that hospitals may file liens in lieu of following up on a health insurance plan’s express or 
presumed denial). 
 191 See, e.g., Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for or to Be Paid 
on Behalf of E.R. ex rel. Ridley, 84 P.3d 418, 435 (Alaska 2004) (citing Martinez v. St. Joseph 
Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1367 (N.M. 1994)) (following the New Mexico Supreme Court’s 
rationale in Martinez and holding that the lack of an obligation to contribute to the injured plaintiff’s 
attorney’s fees incentivizes medical lienholders not to get involved with the settlement proceedings 
and then later collect payment when the attorney disburses the settlement funds). 
 192 See, e.g., 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. 23/10 (2020) (illustrating how a medical lien statute can limit 
the maximum recovery permitted to medical lienholders in tort settlements). For example, some medi-
cal lien statutes cap the portion of a settlement to which a medical lien may attach, and medical pro-
viders rarely, if ever, know how much the tortfeasor will issue the injured plaintiff in compensation 
for the plaintiff’s damages when providers are determining whether to file a lien. See id. (providing an 
example of a state-imposed hard cap on lien recoveries). Thus, asserting liens can be a considerable 
risk to medical providers because they have no way of knowing how much the lien will actually se-
cure. See id. (providing an example of how a state lien statute can add to the uncertainty and risk of 
asserting medical liens by imposing both a hard cap on lien-based recovery and a cap based on the 
aggregate securitization of all medical liens). 
 193 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(3) (demonstrating that filing and foreclosing on a hospital lien 
is a debt collection process that can frequently take many months, if not years, to resolve). For exam-
ple, Utah providers, by statute, may not even assert liens where a patient has a commercial health 
insurance plan until the hospital has billed that plan and the plan has not remitted payment to the pro-
vider after a six-month period reserved for the health plan’s adjudication of the claim. Id. 
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extensive legal fees.194 In such scenarios, there is no need to apply the Doctrine 
to impose mandatory contribution to attorney’s fees, because lienholders effec-
tively pay the plaintiff’s legal fees already, due to mathematically required re-
ductions to the pro-rata share.195 The table below illustrates how medical pro-
viders end up paying the plaintiff’s legal fees in limited fund scenarios, not by 
imposition of the Doctrine, but through the power of the priority system medi-
cal lien statutes establish for attorney liens.196 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See id. § 38-7-1(1)(a) (providing the attachment provision of Utah’s medical lien statute that 
establishes that medical liens attach only to the share of settlement funds that remains after the plain-
tiff’s attorney takes their full fees and costs); see also Harlow v. Lloyd, 809 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1991) (establishing that the attachment provision of Kansas’s medical lien statute also imposes a 
priority system); Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1102 (holding that 
the Utah medical lien statute’s attachment provision grants priority to attorney liens). The math behind 
this contention is simple: if a medical lien statute’s attachment provision permits medical liens to 
attach only to what remains of the tort settlement proceeds after the plaintiff’s attorney takes their fee, 
then a medical lien has the greatest chance of securing the medical provider’s full charges when the 
attorney’s fees are zero. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(1)(a)–(b) (establishing that, although medical 
provider liens are secondary in priority to attorney liens, the Utah statute does not otherwise require 
medical providers to reduce their claims to settlement proceeds). Thus, the only way an attorney can 
actually bring value to a medical lienholder is to secure a greater tort settlement amount than what the 
patient plaintiff could have secured on their own. See Ellison, supra note 12, at 306 (discussing how 
even plaintiffs themselves consider the potential for an attorney to recover more from the settlement 
than the plaintiffs could recover themselves in determining whether to retain counsel). Notably, where 
a tortfeasor offers the full limits of their insurance policy as a remedy for the plaintiff’s damages, it is 
not possible for an attorney to increase the plaintiff’s award unless the attorney sues the tortfeasor 
directly. See, e.g., Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1364 (N.M. 1994) (provid-
ing an example of limited settlement funds constraining an attorney’s efforts to settle a case). 
 195 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(1)(a) (establishing that medical liens in Utah can attach only 
to the settlement funds that remain after the plaintiff’s attorney takes their fee). This is not an issue in 
settlements where there are enough funds available to pay all lienholders and other plaintiff debts in 
full, because pro-rata reductions are unnecessary in such situations. See, e.g., Martinez, 871 P.2d at 
1364 (demonstrating the mathematical necessity of lien reductions where settlement funds are insuffi-
cient to cover the debtor’s financial obligations). Where the amount of the plaintiff’s debts exceed the 
amount of settlement funds available, however, lienholders will need to reduce their claims to a pro-
rata share in order to permit the available funds to cover all the plaintiff’s outstanding liabilities. Id. 
Mathematically, the necessary pro-rata reduction will be less if the plaintiff settles with the tortfeasor 
on their own than it would be if the plaintiff hired an attorney, simply because the attorney’s fee is an 
additional debt that negatively impacts the amount of funds available to the plaintiff’s debt holders. 
See id. (providing a case where the insurance limits were insufficient to cover the patient’s debts and 
the attorney’s fees absorbed a significant portion of the funds). 
 196 The illustration and case study derives from the Author’s ten years’ experience enforcing 
hospital liens on behalf of medical providers and represents hypothetical settlement disbursements 
based on common liability policy limits. In both scenarios, the tortfeasor has issued a settlement offer 
equal to the limit of their liability insurance policy. Thus, whether the plaintiff hires an attorney is 
financially immaterial. An attorney cannot recover in settlement more than the limits of the tortfea-
sor’s insurance policy, which the tortfeasor has offered here. See, e.g., Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1364 
(providing an illustration of how paltry settlement limits can prevent an attorney from settling a case). 
Further, both scenarios present the same complication. The amount of insurance proceeds available 
are insufficient to cover all of the plaintiff’s outstanding medical debts. Where the plaintiff does not 
hire an attorney, the amount available to the medical lienholders is the full $25,000 insurance policy. 
Where the plaintiff hires an attorney, the attorney’s customary contingency fee reduces the amount 
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Line Item Settlement 1 (No Attorney) Settlement 2 (Attorney) 
Tort Settlement Amount $25,000 $25,000 
Attorney’s Fees $0.00 $8,333.33 (33% of settlement) 
Proceeds for Medical Providers $25,000 $16,666.67 
Total Medical Liabilities $50,000 (two liens) $50,000 (two liens) 
Medical Lien #1 $30,000 $30,000 
Pro-rata Share (Recovery) 60% ($15,000) 60% ($10,000) 
Lien Reduced By 50% ($15,000) 66.67% ($20,000) 
Medical Lien #2 $20,000 $20,000 
Pro-rata Share (Recovery) 40% ($10,000) 40% ($6,666.67) 
Lien Reduced By 50% ($10,000) 66.67% ($13,333.333) 
Remainder to Plaintiff $0.00 $0.00 
                                                                                                                           
available to medical lienholders by a third. Thus, hiring an attorney here has the opposite effect of 
conferring a benefit upon medical lienholders; it actually results in medical lienholders recovering less 
than they otherwise would have. See, e.g., Ellison, supra note 12, at 322 (discussing both monetary 
payment and resolution of a debt as traditional benefits under Illinois’ unjust enrichment paradigm). 
This simple example illustrates the danger of either courts or legislatures unilaterally determining that 
medical lienholders always benefit from the work of a plaintiff’s attorney in tort settlements. Not only 
would forcing medical lienholders to contribute a proportionate share of attorney’s fees in the second 
scenario be innately unfair, given that they did not receive any type of gain as a result of the attorney’s 
work, but it would also result in medical lienholders granting hefty reductions on top of the 67% re-
ductions they are already taking as their pro-rata share. This would result in huge losses to medical 
lienholders in compensation for rendering services to a patient they likely had no choice but to treat. 
By comparison, the attorney gets to collect a full contingency fee, despite providing no actual impact 
on the amount of the plaintiff’s financial award. Notably, both the medical lienholder’s right to pay-
ment and the attorney’s right to payment derive from contract. See Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103 (estab-
lishing that the plaintiff patient agrees to pay the hospital by contract at the time of treatment); Ellison, 
supra note 12, at 318 (illustrating the calculation of attorney’s fees on a contingency basis). Notwith-
standing contractual protections of rights to payment, only the attorney is guaranteed a full recovery 
absent a statutory cap, given the priority system that medical lien statutes establish. See, e.g., UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(1)(a) (providing the prioritization of attorney’s fees over all liens in Utah’s med-
ical lien statute). This substantially weakens equity as a justification for applying the Doctrine, as the 
attorney already maintains a favorable position over a creditor whose right to payment pre-dates the 
attorney’s. See Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103 (establishing that a plaintiff’s debt to the hospital derives 
from the paperwork the plaintiff patient completes at the time the hospital provides treatment). On the 
contrary, the essential points of the minority argument appear very inequitable: (1) the medical pro-
vider treats the plaintiff patient immediately after an accident, far too early for the provider or the 
patient to have any conception of the probability of a tort settlement; (2) the patient-plaintiff later hires 
legal counsel, who has the ability to assess the likelihood of a positive settlement outcome before 
deciding whether or not to represent the patient plaintiff for a minimum of 33% of the settlement pro-
ceeds; and (3) the attorney later implores the courts to impose the Doctrine to force reductions on liens 
subordinate to the attorney’s own—despite those liens being first in time—in order for those lienhold-
ers to contribute a proportionate share of the attorney’s fees. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 55.002 
(West 2021) (demonstrating the Texas statute’s rule that for medical providers to assert valid liens, the 
plaintiff must seek treatment at a hospital within seventy-two hours of the accident, a period that, by 
implication, will be too early for the plaintiff to have a realistic understanding of settlement possibili-
ties); Bryner, 428 P.3d at 1103 (noting the impracticality of imposing a contribution requirement on a 
creditor whose right to payment exists independently of the plaintiff patient’s tort settlement); Ellison, 
supra note 12, at 317–20 (providing the methods courts use to calculate attorney’s fees when applying 
the Doctrine, including as a percentage of settlement proceeds). 
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As a final counterpoint, the minority view is a slippery slope towards en-
couraging injured patients to hire an attorney in every negligence tort scenar-
io.197 If application of the Doctrine forced medical lienholders to reduce their 
liens to pay a proportionate share of a plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, then tort plain-
tiffs might feel compelled to hire an attorney, even when legal services are un-
necessary, under the false presumption that doing so could only be, at worst, 
cost neutral.198 
Line Item Settlement 1 (No Attorney) Settlement 2 (Attorney) 
Tort Settlement Amount $100,000 $100,000 
Attorney’s Fees $0.00 $33,333.33 (33% of settlement) 
Proceeds for Medical Providers $100,000 $66,666.67 
Total Medical Liabilities $50,000 (two liens) $50,000 (two liens) 
Medical Lien #1 $30,000 $30,000 
Fee Share Reduction (Recovery) 0% ($30,000) 33% ($20,000) 
Lien Reduced By $0.00 $10,000 
Medical Lien #2 $20,000 $20,000 
Pro-rata Share (Recovery) 0% ($20,000) 33% ($13,333.33) 
Lien Reduced By 50% ($10,000) $6,666.67 
Remainder to Plaintiff $50,000.00 $33,333.34 
 
The above comparison shows that hiring an attorney in jurisdictions that 
impose a mandatory fee-sharing requirement, either through application of the 
Doctrine or otherwise, can result in both the plaintiff and medical lienholders 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See, e.g., Yaeger v. City of Lincoln (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bloomquist), 
523 N.W.2d 352, 360 (Neb. 1994) (holding that medical lienholders should contribute a proportionate 
share of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees because medical providers are reliant on the plaintiffs’ attorney to 
recover on medical liens, thereby implying that attorneys are necessary to settle a tort claim). 
 198 The second chart demonstrates how this can happen within a hypothetical settlement arrange-
ment. In either scenario, the sum of the plaintiff’s accident-related debt is comprised of two medical 
liens totaling $50,000. The liability insurance policy tenders full settlement limits of $100,000. Be-
cause the settlement proceeds are higher than the total medical debt, pro-rata reductions of the medical 
liens are not necessary. Without an attorney, the medical providers receive full payment, and the 
plaintiff collects the remaining settlement funds of $50,000. With an attorney, one-third of the settle-
ment amount is reserved for the attorney’s fees, and each medical provider must reduce its lien by 
33% due to application of the Doctrine to impose a fee sharing requirement. As a result, each party 
recovers exactly one-third of the total settlement amount: the attorney, the plaintiff, and the class of 
lienholders. Although this may seem equitable, both the plaintiff and the lienholders secured less 
money from the settlement in order to compensate an attorney who did not secure any additional set-
tlement funds over what the plaintiff would have received by settling the claim without retaining legal 
counsel. Unless the plaintiff receives a settlement offer from the insurance company before hiring an 
attorney, the plaintiff will likely never know if the attorney’s representation results in a net gain over 
what the plaintiff would have recovered pro se. 
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recovering less than they would have if the plaintiff had settled on their own.199 
From an unjust enrichment perspective, such a result seems to provide a signif-
icant windfall to the attorney, to the detriment of the attorney’s client and med-
ical lienholders.200 
C. The Legislative Intent Argument: Medical Lien Statutes Provide  
Security in Treating Potentially Uninsured Patients,  
Not an Expectation of Full Reimbursement 
Proponents of the minority position have cited a simple policy justifica-
tion for medical liens statutes: state legislatures did not intend for such statutes 
to guarantee full recovery.201 Rather, the statutes provide hospitals the ability to 
use liens as a security against the risk of treating uninsured patients.202 Thus, 
medical providers should not balk at imposed reductions to contribute a pro-
portionate share of plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees because medical lien statutes do 
not impose a reasonable expectation of dollar-for-dollar reimbursement on the 
amount such liens secure.203 This argument represents hospital treatment in a 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See supra note 198 and accompanying text (providing an illustration and discussion of how an 
attorney’s involvement in settlement proceedings can result in smaller recoveries for both the plaintiff 
and lienholders than what the plaintiff might be able to secure without the aid of counsel). 
 200 See supra note 198 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the attorney can recover a full 
fee without generating a better recovery than what the plaintiff could have secured on their own); see 
also Ellison, supra note 12, at 321 (providing the Illinois Supreme Court’s description of the compo-
nents of unjust enrichment). Under the second chart’s hypothetical scenario, the attorney arguably 
realizes unjust enrichment. The attorney receives a monetary gain at the expense of the plaintiff, and 
the attorney’s retention of that gain, in compensation for services that decreased, rather than bolstered, 
the plaintiff’s recovery, would be an affront to justice and fairness. See id. at 321–26 (elaborating on 
what constitutes a gain and what constitutes a violation of justice in accordance with the Illinois Su-
preme Court’s definition of unjust enrichment); supra note 198 and accompanying text (providing an 
accounting of two hypothetical scenarios that comparatively demonstrate how a plaintiff might recov-
er more from a settlement by not hiring an attorney than by doing so). 
 201 See Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360 (holding that medical lien statutes merely provide a means by 
which medical providers can collect on debts associated with treating indigent patients, not a means of 
collecting accident-related debts at total charges). But see Schulte, supra note 16, at 1788 (arguing the 
majority position but also contending that legislatures passed hospital lien statutes to serve as an im-
portant bulwark against financial risks hospitals take in treating uninsured patients). 
 202 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 308–09 (suggesting that the primary policy reason for lien stat-
utes is to increase medical provider confidence in admitting and treating patients who may not have 
any means to pay for the medical services rendered to them). At least one state supreme court has 
determined that the legislative intent behind enactment of a medical lien statute is to grant medical 
providers additional protection from treating patients who have no ability to pay. See Univ. of S. Ala. 
v. Progressive Ins. Co., 904 So. 2d 1242, 1246–47 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Ex parte Univ. of S. Ala., 761 
So. 2d 240, 244 (Ala. 1999)) (maintaining that the state legislature enacted its medical lien statute as a 
protective measure for medical providers). Some proponents of the use of the Doctrine infer from that 
policy justification that medical providers should not look to medical lien statutes as a means to re-
cover the full amount of the provider’s billed charges. See Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360 (holding that 
medical lien statutes are a means of recovery for medical providers, not a guarantee of full payment). 
 203 See Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360 (noting that medical lien statutes permit providers to collect on 
debt that providers would otherwise almost certainly adjust off as non-recoverable). 
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manner that is contradictory to federal law.204 Hospitals must treat and stabilize 
patients who seek treatment through the emergency room, regardless of the 
patient’s ability to pay.205 Thus, to say that medical lien statutes grant medical 
providers the confidence to treat accident patients who may not have insurance 
is irrelevant.206 Medical providers have to treat those patients regardless of the 
financial risk such patients present.207 Further, even absent federal laws that 
require hospitals to treat any patient who comes into their emergency rooms, 
the application of the Doctrine to impose fee sharing would significantly ne-
gate the security that medical lien acts grant to medical providers in treating 
uninsured patients.208 
                                                                                                                           
 204 Compare Ellison, supra 12, at 308–09 (quoting Univ. of S. Ala., 904 So. 2d at 1246–47) 
(maintaining that medical lien statutes offer medical providers the peace of mind necessary to admit 
and treat patients despite not being able to establish beforehand whether or not the patient is capable 
of compensating the medical provider for its services), with Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (providing the federal law requirements for medical providers, in 
situations of medical emergency, either to render stabilizing treatment to a patient or to conduct an 
appropriate transfer of a patient to an alternative medical facility, regardless of whether or not the 
patient has the ability to pay for such services). 
 205 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (establishing the requirements federal law imposes on providers 
who admit patients on an emergency basis). Federal law requires medical providers to provide stabi-
lizing treatment to anyone who presents an “emergency medical condition.” Id. The law defines 
“emergency medical condition” broadly, including essentially any malady that, if left unexamined or 
untreated, could result in significant health complications for the patient. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1). 
 206 See id. § 1395dd(b)(1) (providing the federal law requirements for emergency medical treat-
ment by a medical facility). Although a state statute can ease the potential financial burdens the feder-
al law imposes, the implication that the state statute grants medical providers the financial security 
that they require to comply with federal law is simply inaccurate. See supra note 204 and accompany-
ing text (comparing the suggestion that medical providers might turn away injured patients if not for 
the security that medical lien statutes provide with the requirements of the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Active Labor Act). A medical provider must comply with federal law, regardless of any 
rights or obligations the provider’s state jurisdiction establishes. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (estab-
lishing that federal law supersedes state law when a conflict exists between the two). 
 207 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1); see also supra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing the 
federal law requirements for emergency medical treatment). 
 208 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 308–09 (arguing that a substantial advantage that medical lien 
statues provide is the assurance that a treating medical provider will be able to recover the charges for 
its services); Schulte, supra note 16, at 1788 (arguing that protection against the financial risks associ-
ated with treating patients who have insufficient means to pay is a critical function of medical lien 
statutes). Forced reductions of medical liens to pay for attorney’s fees, especially where medical lien 
statutes already cap recovery, significantly weaken the argument that liens grant medical providers the 
financial surety necessary to treat potentially indigent patients. See Ellison, supra note 12, at 308–09 
(providing the argument that medical lien statutes confer the substantial benefit of financial security 
on medical providers). If a lien statute can offer only an extremely qualified right to payment—subject 
to a legal contract to which the medical provider is not party but to which its right to payment is 
bound—asserting a lien does little to improve the medical provider’s odds of securing reasonable 
reimbursement for its services. See Yaeger, 523 N.W.2d at 360 (illustrating the grim odds of recovery 
for a medical provider that does not attach a lien to a tort plaintiff’s settlement). 
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IV. THE WAY FORWARD: ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO IMPOSING THE 
COMMON FUND DOCTRINE TO REDUCE MEDICAL PROVIDER LIENS 
The issue of whether courts should compel medical lienholders to reduce 
their liens illustrates that the paucity of available funds in tort settlements in 
comparison to tort-related medical debt is a significant and frequent prob-
lem.209 Complicating this problem is the fact that there is no universal standard 
for addressing medical provider liens because such liens are a product of state 
law.210 The recent call from academia urges courts to reconsider the applicabil-
ity of the Doctrine in these contexts and lawmakers to consider amending med-
ical lien laws to require providers to contribute a portion of plaintiffs’ attor-
ney’s fees.211 Such results would deprive medical providers of important rights 
and significantly disadvantage them.212 This Part offers two alternative ideas to 
consider.213 
Section A of this Part proposes the federal Bankruptcy Code as a model 
for how lawmakers, in writing or amending hospital lien statutes, should con-
sider which creditors should contribute to attorney’s fees, and which should 
not, when tort settlement funds are scarce.214 Section B discusses updating 
state automobile insurance laws as an alternative approach to blanket forced 
reductions of medical liens, by use of the Doctrine or otherwise, when tort 
funds are unable to make plaintiffs whole.215 
                                                                                                                           
 209 See generally Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement Funds Held for or to Be 
Paid on Behalf of E.R. ex rel. Ridley, 84 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004) (providing analysis of the issue in 
one state court); McVey v. M.L.K. Enters., L.L.C., 2015 IL 118143, 32 N.E.3d 1112 (same); 
Wendling v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs., 950 N.E.2d 646 (Ill. 2011) (same); Maynard v. Parker, 387 N.E.2d 
298 (Ill. 1979) (same); Harlow v. Lloyd, 809 P.2d 1228 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Yaeger v. City 
of Lincoln (In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Bloomquist), 523 N.W.2d 352 (Neb. 1994) 
(same); Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363 (N.M. 1994) (same); Bashara v. Baptist 
Mem’l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1985) (same); Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 
52, 428 P.3d 1096 (same); Lynch v. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 776 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1989) (same). 
 210 See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 110–13 (discussing the process by which Illinois enacted its 
Health Care Services Lien Act); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing how sever-
al states establish lien rights for medical providers). 
 211 See Ellison, supra note 12, at 326–27 (arguing for amendment of the Illinois Health Care Ser-
vices Lien Act to add a requirement for medical lienholders to contribute a proportionate share of 
plaintiff’s legal fees to effectuate the purpose of the Doctrine); Reynolds, supra note 10, at 137 (argu-
ing that courts should reevaluate previous decisions not to impose the Doctrine in the context of tort 
settlements). 
 212 See supra Part III (arguing against the various defenses for applying the Doctrine to impose a 
fee sharing requirement on medical lienholders). 
 213 See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B. 
 214 See infra notes 216–233 and accompanying text. 
 215 See infra notes 234–239 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Federal Bankruptcy Code Model: Unsecured  
Creditors Pay Attorney’s Fees 
Like tort settlements, Chapter 7 bankruptcy provides a scenario where the 
representative of an indebted individual creates a fund to pay the individual’s 
secured and unsecured creditors.216 The Bankruptcy Code establishes the rules 
for prioritizing each of the individual’s debts in the distribution scheme of the 
individual’s liquidated assets.217 The Bankruptcy Code is a federal code.218 
Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code can provide a single, compelling source for 
understanding how best to visualize the relationship between attorney’s fees 
and creditors as lawmakers consider amending current hospital lien laws.219 
The Bankruptcy Code’s priority system establishes that secured creditors 
receive the first distribution of a debtor’s assets.220 Second in right to distribu-
tion are what the Bankruptcy Code terms “priority claims,” unique debts that 
policy considerations dictate should retain special status over other types of 
                                                                                                                           
 216 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a) (establishing the duties of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, including 
the collection and liquidation of all assets of the debtor into a fund for distribution to the debtor’s 
creditors); see also id. § 726(a)(6) (establishing that the Chapter 7 debtor receives a distribution of 
liquidated assets only after all creditors release their allowed claims). Under the Bankruptcy Code, a 
creditor includes, but is not limited to, an entity that possesses a “claim against the debtor that arose at 
the time of or before the [bankruptcy court’s issuance of an] order for [bankruptcy] relief concerning 
the debtor.” Id. § 101(10)(A); see also id. § 101(5)(A) (defining a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code 
as a “right to payment”); id. § 101(15) (defining an “entity” under the Bankruptcy Code as “includ[ing 
a] person, estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States trustee”); id. § 101(41) (defining a “per-
son” as including “[an] individual, partnership, and corporation”). The Bankruptcy Code does not 
define either a secured creditor or an unsecured creditor, but it does define security interest as a “lien 
created by an agreement.” Id. § 101(51). The Bankruptcy Code further defines “lien” as a “charge 
against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.” Id. 
§ 101(37). Thus, a secured creditor is a creditor with a property interest against the debtor that secures 
a debt that the debtor owes to the creditor, and an unsecured creditor is a creditor without such protec-
tion for its right to payment against the debtor. See id. § 101(10)(A), (37), (51) (providing the Bank-
ruptcy Code definitions of “creditor,” “lien,” and “security interest,” respectively). Further, the Bank-
ruptcy Code establishes that a creditor’s right to payment is secured up to the value of the estate’s 
interest in the asset that secures the creditor’s claim. Id. § 506(a)(1). To the extent the creditor’s claim 
exceeds the estate’s interest in the asset, the creditor’s right to payment is unsecured. Id. 
 217 Id. § 726(a). The Chapter 7 priority scheme establishes three broad categories of claims: (1) 
secured claims; (2) priority unsecured claims; and (3) non-priority unsecured claims. Id. § 726(a)(1)–
(5). 
 218 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (relegating the authority to pass laws relating to bankruptcy to 
Congress alone and establishing that bankruptcy laws must be uniform). 
 219 See id. art. VI, cl. 2. (providing for the supremacy of federal law over state law); see also 11 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A)(i) (establishing that fees for bankruptcy trustees and bankruptcy attorneys are 
administrative expenses under the Bankruptcy Code); id. § 725 (establishing the treatment of secured 
creditors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings); id. § 726(a)(1) (providing the priority scheme for 
allowed, priority, unsecured claims). 
 220 See 11 U.S.C. § 725 (stating that the bankruptcy trustee, prior to distribution, must dispose of 
any property subject to a lien interest, thereby implying that the trustee must pay all secured creditors, 
including lienholders, before paying any unsecured claims). 
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debts.221 At the bottom of the priority system are non-priority claims, including 
general unsecured claims, non-compensatory financial obligations, and al-
lowed interest.222 
Lienholders in bankruptcy proceedings are, by definition, secured credi-
tors.223 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code entitles lienholders to first priority in the dis-
tribution of the debtor’s assets.224 Specifically, a lienholder receives dollar-for-
dollar reimbursement on its claim in bankruptcy so long as the debtor has suffi-
cient equity in the asset against which the lienholder has asserted its lien.225 
Fees for debtor representation in bankruptcy—both those of a bankruptcy 
trustee and bankruptcy attorneys—are administrative expenses under the 
Bankruptcy Code.226 Administrative expenses are among the first priority 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See id. § 726(a)(1) (establishing that allowed priority claims receive distribution prior to any 
other unsecured claims). Priority claims include, inter alia, domestic support obligations, administra-
tive expenses, gap credit extended between the date of petition and the date of court approval in invol-
untary bankruptcy cases, employee wages and benefit plans, and various tax liabilities. See id. 
§ 507(a) (describing each of the ten categories of priority claims). 
 222 See id. § 726(a)(2)–(4) (providing the priority scheme for distribution to non-priority unse-
cured claims). Any funds available after distribution to all claimants under the priority scheme go to 
the debtor. Id. § 726(a)(6). The language of medical lien statutes can establish a similar distribution 
model. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-1(1)(a) (West 2018) (establishing that the settlement funds 
to which medical liens attach are the property of the plaintiff). In a tort settlement scenario, the plain-
tiff’s legal representative pools together the plaintiff’s property—here, the settlement funds—and 
distributes it to pay off creditors according to a priority scheme. See id. (noting that medical liens 
attach to the plaintiff’s settlement funds). The plaintiff pockets whatever is left after creditors, includ-
ing the plaintiff’s attorney, receive payment and release their claims to the settlement. See id. (noting 
both that medical liens attach to the settlement funds and that the plaintiff is responsible for paying 
attorney’s fees). The Chapter 7 bankruptcy priority scheme establishes an exceptionally similar dis-
bursement methodology. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6) (establishing that Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceed-
ings remit funds to the debtor only once all of the debtor’s creditors have released their claims upon 
the property of the debtor’s estate). 
 223 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (providing that a lien in the context of bankruptcy secures a creditor’s 
right to payment from a debtor). 
 224 See id. § 725 (providing the portion of the Bankruptcy Code priority scheme that compels the 
bankruptcy trustee to resolve the claims of secured creditors prior to those of unsecured creditors). 
 225 See id. § 506(a)(1) (establishing that the value of a lienholder’s interest in the property of the 
debtor is equal to the amount to which the creditor has a right to payment from the debtor, so long as 
the value of the debtor’s interest in the property subject the lien is sufficient to cover the debt); id. 
§ 726(b) (establishing that all creditors at the same tier of priority on the Chapter 7 distribution 
scheme share a pro rata recovery if the debtor’s assets are insufficient to pay all debts of the tier in 
full). 
 226 See id. § 507(a)(2) (providing that all administrative expenses identified in 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) 
of the Bankruptcy Code are second in right amongst all priority unsecured claims, with only domestic 
support obligations outranking them). The Bankruptcy Code establishes a litany of debts in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 503(b) that constitute administrative expenses, including fees of the bankruptcy trustee and any legal 
representation the bankruptcy trustee retains. See id. § 503(b)(1)(A)(i) (establishing that bankruptcy 
trustee and attorney’s fees are included in administrative expenses, as costs incurred after the debtor 
petitions for bankruptcy and pursuant to the maintenance of the debtor’s estate). 
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claims paid but are still subordinate to all secured claims.227 Thus, claims relat-
ing to the debtor’s retaining of representation to liquidate the debtor’s assets 
and pay off the debtor’s creditors receive remuneration from the same pool of 
funds as the claims of the debtor’s unsecured creditors.228 
Policy considerations justify this priority scheme.229 Administrative ex-
penses receive payment after secured creditors but before unsecured creditors, 
meaning that unsecured creditors effectively pay for the debtor’s bankruptcy 
representation.230 This makes sense, as lienholders pay to assert their liens, and 
unsecured creditors, outside of bankruptcy, would need to do the same to guar-
antee recovery from a debtor.231 Thus, if secured creditors receive priority 
payment because of the efforts and costs they incur to assert a lien, and unse-
cured creditors rely solely on the efforts of the bankruptcy trustee for payment, 
it makes sense that unsecured creditors pay administrative fees and secured 
creditors do not.232 The Bankruptcy Code further illustrates this policy justifi-
                                                                                                                           
 227 See id. § 725 (confirming that secured creditors receive payment on their liens in bankruptcy 
prior to any other distribution of liquidated assets); see also id. § 507(a)(2) (establishing that attor-
ney’s fees incurred to settle a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, as administrative expenses, occupy an ex-
ceptionally high position amongst unsecured claims in bankruptcy, second only to domestic support 
obligations); id. § 726(a)(1)–(2) (establishing that non-priority unsecured claims receive a distribution 
only after priority unsecured claims receive payment, implying that unsecured, non-priority claimants 
effectively pay for administrative expenses, including fees of the bankruptcy trustee and legal coun-
sel). 
 228 See supra note 227 and accompanying text (providing the Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 7 prior-
ity scheme with respect to secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and bankruptcy attorney’s fees). 
 229 See Chapter 7—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/MGR8-LY2Y] (estab-
lishing that the principal function of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee is to grant the best recovery 
possible to unsecured creditors). Chapter 7 is an equitable proceeding for unsecured creditors, not 
secured creditors. Id. Secured creditors, if their liens are valid, enforceable, and allowed, technically 
do not participate in the distribution scheme, because the bankruptcy trustee resolves their liens prior 
to distribution. 11 U.S.C. § 725. Thus, because a secured creditor’s right to payment is dependent on 
the debtor’s equity in the asset subject to the lien, and not on the bankruptcy trustee’s liquidation of 
the asset, it makes sense that secured creditors make no contribution to payment of any fees pursuant 
to administration of the bankruptcy case, including bankruptcy trustee fees and attorney’s fees. See id. 
(providing that the bankruptcy trustee is required to settle all secured creditor claims prior to distribu-
tion to the debtor’s unsecured obligations). 
 230 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (providing administrative expenses with second highest priority 
amongst unsecured priority claims in bankruptcy); see also id. § 725 (establishing by implication that 
bankruptcy trustees in a Chapter 7 proceeding are to pay secured claims before distribution to any 
bankruptcy claimant); id. § 726(a)(1)–(2) (establishing that priority unsecured claims receive a distri-
bution in bankruptcy before non-priority unsecured claims). 
 231 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-7-2 (West 2018) (providing the filing and notice require-
ments for asserting a hospital lien in one state, thereby illustrating the steps a medical provider must 
take at state law to receive the protections on its right to payment that a lien affords). 
 232 See supra note 227 and accompanying text. Notably, this proposed priority scheme gives val-
ue to the minority position’s argument that without an obligation to contribute to attorney’s fees, 
lienholders contribute nothing to settlement proceedings yet enjoy the all the benefits therefrom. See, 
e.g., Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare Sys., 871 P.2d 1363, 1367 (N.M. 1994) (holding that lienhold-
ers who do not pay attorney’s fees can simply remain idle and await payment). Medical lienholders in 
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cation by subordinating to a status inferior to administrative expense claimants 
those creditors who could have filed a lien prior to commencement of the 
debtor’s bankruptcy case but failed to do so.233 
B. Updating of State Automobile Insurance Laws to  
Raise Minimum Coverage Limits 
Legislatures and courts should not force medical providers to reduce their 
liens in all cases, especially where tort proceeds are sufficient to make the 
plaintiff whole.234 It is especially hard in these types of cases to make the equi-
ty argument.235 If there is plenty of money available for all creditors to receive 
                                                                                                                           
tort settlements do not fail to contribute simply because they do not share in the attorney’s fees. See 
supra notes 180–182 and accompanying text (arguing, inter alia, that in filing a lien, a medical pro-
vider assists a plaintiff in proving damages). Further, filing a hospital lien and awaiting settlement 
represents both risk and sunk costs for a medical provider. See supra notes 191–193 and accompany-
ing text (arguing that choosing to assert a lien against a plaintiff’s tort settlement is a business process 
for hospitals, with some disadvantages). Creditors in lien settlements who do not file liens, however, 
likely fit much more into the Martinez v. St. Joseph Healthcare System court’s characterization of 
creditors who remain inoperative while settlement proceedings commence and then expect reim-
bursement when they finalize. See 871 P.2d at 1367 (describing the court’s views of the roles of plain-
tiff’s attorneys and medical lienholders in settlement proceedings). For this reason, the gain that an 
unsecured creditor realizes from the work of the plaintiff’s attorney is far less incidental than that of 
secured creditors, and it is therefore equitable for secured creditors not to contribute to attorney’s fees, 
but for unsecured creditors to do so. See id. (providing the court’s reasoning as to why the benefit a 
creditor receives from the work of a plaintiff’s attorney is not merely attendant). 
 233 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (providing eighth position priority claim status to unsecured 
tax claims). The government can assert liens to secure a debtor’s tax obligations. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6321 (providing lien rights to the government on owed but uncollected taxes). Where the govern-
ment asserts a valid, enforceable, and unavoidable tax lien against a debtor in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, 
the government is a secured creditor in that debtor’s bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (defining a 
lien within the scope of bankruptcy as securing a right to payment). Where the government does not 
act on its right to assert a tax lien prior to the commencement of the debtor’s bankruptcy case, the 
bankruptcy priority scheme subordinates the debtor’s tax debts to unsecured status. See id. § 507(a)(8) 
(providing one example of subordinated status for unsecured tax debts). 
 234 See Harlow v. Lloyd, 809 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (noting the argument that 
courts should apply the Doctrine only in cases where there are not enough settlement funds for the 
plaintiff to pay all of their debts, including those owed to medical lienholders and to his attorney). 
 235 See Martinez, 871 P.2d at 1364 (providing a case where the plaintiff’s debts exceeded the 
settlement funds). Where the settlement funds are insufficient to cover all of the plaintiff’s debts, 
reductions in medical liens permit the plaintiff to pocket money, regardless of whether the plaintiff 
uses those reductions to pay attorney’s fees. See id. (providing itemized debt amounts to demonstrate 
how reductions work mathematically). To permit the plaintiff to pocket money where the plaintiff 
otherwise would not is an equity justification for the reduction of medical liens. See id. at 1366 (agree-
ing with the idea that fairness dictates that plaintiffs should not shoulder all litigation costs). To permit 
the plaintiff simply to pocket more of the settlement than the plaintiff already would, and to ensure the 
plaintiff’s attorney recovers a full fee, is less justifiable from an equity perspective. See Bryner v. 
Cardon Outreach, L.L.C., 2018 UT 52, 428 P.3d 1096, 1103 (holding that it is impractical and unrea-
sonable to compel a medical lienholder to contribute to attorney’s fees independent of the result of the 
tort suit). 
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full recovery and for the plaintiff to pocket some funds as well, there should be 
no detriment to the plaintiff for them to pay each debt in full.236 
Rather than trying to free up limited funds by applying an equity doctrine 
largely out of context or calling on state legislatures to amend medical lien 
statutes, proponents of the minority view should lobby state legislatures to in-
crease the minimum required insurance coverage.237 If excess settlement funds 
largely mitigate medical providers’ need to contribute to attorney’s fees, then 
those seeking to impose that requirement should instead seek to maximize the 
frequency of cases where sufficient settlement funds are available.238 To the 
extent such a lobbying effort is not possible, or in the rare case afterward 
where settlement funds are still insufficient, plaintiffs’ attorneys and medical 
lienholders should submit to a true pro-rata arrangement.239 
                                                                                                                           
 236 See Harlow, 809 P.2d at 1231 (noting that where there are sufficient financial proceeds to 
settle all of the plaintiff’s tort-related damages, there is no justification for any lienholder to absorb a 
portion of the proceeds that are intended for another lienholder). 
 237 See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 136 (noting the painstaking effort necessary to amend a medi-
cal lien statute). Kannaday v. Ball provides an excellent case study on how current minimum insur-
ance limits can fail miserably to cover accident victims. 631 F. App’x 635, 636–37 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(illustrating that the tortfeasor’s $50,000 per accident liability limits were entirely inadequate to cover 
the injured victims’ aggregate medical bills of nearly $300,000). Curiously, although proponents of 
using the Doctrine to compel medical providers to reduce their liens have proposed a number of solu-
tions to support insolvent tort plaintiffs, they do not suggest raising insurance limits as a possible 
solution. See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 136–37 (providing stricter rules regarding health insurance 
billing and hospital charge calculation as possible answers to the problem, but not addressing the 
paucity of liability insurance coverage as a possible source); see also Ellison, supra note 12, at 326–
27 (offering an amendment of the Illinois Health Care Services Lien Act to require use of the Doctrine 
as a solution, but not proposing to change Illinois liability insurance laws as an alternative option). 
Perhaps the most obvious disadvantage of this strategy is that portions of the public might not be able 
to afford increased liability insurance premiums, though the fact that the price of liability insurance is 
currently not a significant issue for drivers somewhat mitigates this concern. See Engstrom, supra 
note 54, at 303 (noting that public apprehension about the price of automobile liability coverage is 
relatively mild). 
 238 See Harlow, 809 P.2d at 1232–33 (following the suggestion that whether to apply the Doctrine 
to impose forced reductions on medical lienholders in tort settlements to contribute a proportionate 
share of attorney’s fees justifiably applies only to scenarios with insufficient settlement funds). 
 239 See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 106 (noting that the basis of the tort system is the idea of mak-
ing the plaintiff whole). The serious and tragic facts of Martinez provide an example where all claim-
ants against a settlement, including the attorney, should work together to provide as much money for 
the injured party as possible. 871 P.2d at 1364. The accident in Martinez was a hit-and-run. Id. The 
plaintiff never successfully located the tortfeasor and died before settling the claim (due to unspecified 
causes), leaving behind a minor child. Id. Martinez also demonstrates that although medical provider 
liens can constitute significant claims against the plaintiff’s settlement, attorney’s fees can as well. See 
id. (providing an example of a case where the tortfeasor’s insurance company settled with the plaintiff 
for just over $101,000 and the plaintiff’s legal fees and costs amounted to over $38,000). In fact, be-
cause attorney’s fees often accrue as a percentage of the secured settlement amount, it is arguable that 
attorney’s fees are nearly guaranteed to absorb a significant portion of the settlement funds. See 
Goguen, supra note 174 (discussing the contingency model for attorney’s fees). Thus, for a tort set-
tlement with insufficient funds to realize its goal of making the plaintiff whole, a pro-rata reduction of 
all claims, including attorney’s fees, is logical and equitable. See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 106 
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CONCLUSION 
Tort settlements are an important source of financial recovery, both for in-
jured plaintiffs and for the medical providers who treat them. Where settlement 
funds are in limited supply, hiring an attorney can be a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, plaintiffs’ attorneys can be instrumental in negotiating down 
debts and ensuring that the funds that are available cover all of a plaintiff’s 
tort-related losses. On the other hand, attorney’s fees impose a considerable 
additional expense upon a complicated financial proceeding where there is of-
ten already not enough money to go around. 
Understandably, attorneys who vigorously defend their client’s interests 
have looked to the courts to grant relief in such circumstances by ordering 
medical lienholders to reduce their liens. Attorneys claiming equity concerns 
as justification for such forced reductions, however, should look for more equi-
table options. Approaching the issue as a zero-sum game only produces results 
where somebody loses. If the issue is that tort settlements too often result in 
insufficient funds, then attorneys and medical providers should work together 
to lobby state legislatures to change the often paltry minimum insurance re-
quirements that drive poor settlement outcomes. That is the leash that holds the 
dog, and addressing insufficient state-enacted minimum insurance coverage is 
the only way to ensure better outcomes for all tort settlement claimants. 
SCOTT J. SHELTRA 
                                                                                                                           
(discussing the restorative purpose of the tort system). Notably, the attorney and the other lienholders 
in Martinez had previously reduced their fees, and the attorney brought suit to compel the hospital to 
do the same. 871 P.2d at 1364. Thus, pursuant to the full pro-rata arrangement that the attorney was 
trying to produce, the result is Martinez is justifiable, despite the court’s adoption of the minority 
position. See id. at 1368 (providing the court’s decision to apply the Doctrine to impose fee sharing 
liability on the medical lienholder). 
